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 The public saw the wars in Iraq (2003 – 2012) and Afghanistan (2001 – present) 
through the lens of reverence and sentimentality toward the soldier. This was manifest 
not simply in the catchy “support our troops” rhetoric, but in the one-sided depiction of 
the experience of battle by the photojournalists who worked for the major news 
organizations in the Western world. From the emotionally bloated to the nationalistic, the 
photographs taken by “embedded” photojournalists, whether the result of heavy-handed 
censorship or merely political influence, presented a consistent image: the soldier as a 
selfless victim of his or her own heroism. This practice stands in stark contrast to the 
coverage and reception of the soldiers who fought in Vietnam, and who were often 
pictured and treated as inhumane and malicious. 
 This paper argues that while the strong public opposition to involvement in 
Vietnam was largely contingent upon the images that portrayed the soldier as an 
unethical and malignant presence, the lessons from Vietnam were, in this case, learned by 
the government and media organizations that sought to justify the similar invasive 
presence of soldiers in the Middle East. By comparing the common themes and iconic 
photographs from the war in Vietnam with those from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
this paper shows how the newly established cult of the soldier attempted to instill public 
support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while more critical and violent images, 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: INCOGNITO ACTIVISTS? STOCKHOLM 
SYNDROME? 
For the past several decades, a specter has been haunting America – the specter of 
the Vietnam War. The Vietnamese have long believed that the war dead return to haunt 
living.  Heonik Kwon, in his book Ghosts of War in Vietnam (2008), used this imagery to 
illustrate how the memory of the war continues to be a significant presence in the lives of 
the Vietnamese people. But, like Marilyn Young suggested, the Vietnam War was not 
just a civil war between the North and South of Vietnam. It was also an American civil 
war.1 Never since the actual Civil War had the country been more divided. With this 
context in mind, it should come as no surprise that Americans have been haunted by the 
specters of the Vietnam War just as the Vietnamese people have been haunted by the 
spirits of their war dead. 
 In fact, this very ghostly analogy has become popular parlance for the continued 
effect of the Vietnam War on the American consciousness. For one, the father/daughter 
team of Marvin and Deborah Kalb has recently published a book titled Haunting Legacy: 
Vietnam and the American Presidency from Ford to Obama (2010). In this far-reaching 
                                                      
1 Marilyn B. Young. “Epilogue: The Vietnam War in American Memory,” in M.E. 
Gettleman, J. Franklyn, M.B. Young and H.B. Franklin (eds.), Vietnam and America: A 
Documented History (New York: Grove, 1995): 516. 
2 Marvin and Deborah Kalb. Haunting Legacy: Vietnam and the American Presidency 
from Ford to Obama. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011): 241 
3 Kalb. Haunting Legacy: 292. 
4 Vicki Goldberg. The Power of Photography. (New York: Abbeville Publishing Group, 
1991). 
5 As quoted in Sherry Ricchiardi. “Close to the Action.” American Journalism Review. 
(College Park: University System of Maryland Foundation, 2003) Online. Accessed 17 
January 2012. http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=2991. 
6 Andrew Lindner. “Among the Troops: Seeing the Iraq War Through Three Journalistic 
Vantage Points.” Social Problems, Vol. 56, No. 1. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2009): 24. 
7 As quoted in Ricchiardi. “Close to the Action.” 
8 Mike Kamber and Tim Arango. “4,000 U.S. Deaths and a Handful of Images.” The New 
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work, they trace the depth with which the idea of the Vietnam War has permeated 
American politics since the war ended. They show how the Vietnam War has been very 
much on everyone’s mind as a precedent for foreign wars in the recent past.  
 One of the more recent incarnations of the specter of the Vietnam War showed 
itself during President Barack Obama’s first National Security Council meeting in 
January of 2009. President Obama declared that Afghanistan was not Vietnam.2 It is no 
coincidence that General David Patreaus, former commander of the U.S. and NATO 
forces in Afghanistan, wrote his doctoral thesis on the military lessons learned in 
Vietnam.3 Many precautions were taken to ensure that counter-insurgency struggles in 
the Middle East would not result in another “quagmire” like the Vietnam War. 
  But this specter of the Vietnam War is more than just a frequently cited military 
precedent. It was not just a mistake from which war planners have learned valuable 
strategy. It remains a ghastly memory always lingering on the horizon.  But what made it 
so? Why is the American mind haunted with a veteran’s violent post-traumatic 
flashbacks? What happened back in Vietnam that continues to live as a specter today? 
 Photographs are a significant part of the answer to those questions. Vietnam was 
photographed and televised more than any previous conflict. The photographs produced 
during the Vietnam War were not only numerous, but also high in rhetorical value. The 
events of Vietnam themselves were recorded and reported via photojournalism, but the 
images of these events became events themselves. On one level they were constantative, 
meaning they signified content. On another level, they were also performative. Just like 
                                                      
2 Marvin and Deborah Kalb. Haunting Legacy: Vietnam and the American Presidency 
from Ford to Obama. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011): 241 
3 Kalb. Haunting Legacy: 292. 
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performative speech acts, their very presentation was an expressive action, intervening in 
actual events. 
  
1.1 Photojournalism as Photonationalism 
Photonationalism. What does that ominous neologism mean? Firstly, Vietnam 
was a watershed in the history of photography for a number of reasons. War has 
consistently been a point of interest for some of the world’s most gifted photographers, 
and, in that sense, every war has its iconic images. Photographs from the war in Vietnam, 
however, are exceptional because they contradicted many of the commonly accepted 
themes and tropes of iconic war photography, especially for Americans. They provided 
valuable lessons in the power of photography, to borrow the title of Vicki Goldberg’s 
book.4  
 Some of the most memorable photographs from the Vietnam War look like they 
could have been pulled from Goya’s Los Desastres de la Guerra. They functioned then 
as they do now, as chilling indictments of violence and the political ideology that 
engendered it. These photographs were produced in a large part because of the freedoms 
that were granted to journalists during the Vietnam War.  Most were independent from 
government agencies, roaming the front lines unencumbered and documenting the war as 
it appeared before the lens.  
 Photographs that enter the cultural vernacular become like signs. They lose some 
of their nuances and function metonymically for certain ideas. This is why they are called 
iconic – an icon as a representative symbol. Photographs characterize war and soldiers in 
                                                      
4 Vicki Goldberg. The Power of Photography. (New York: Abbeville Publishing Group, 
1991). 
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general. By the close of the Vietnam War in 1975, several of these photographs-as-
metonyms had helped to serve what became a national cause in the U.S. – the antiwar 
movement. Many photographs pictured the war as despicable and tragic for those 
involved. Moreover, there was unpredictable fallout from these photographs as they 
became weapons in the war to win hearts and minds. This is the first meaning of 
photonationalism. The photographs were not created as propaganda, yet were usurped to 
serve a national ideology.  
 Photographically speaking, there are several instances where Pentagon-policed 
embedding policy has led to photographs that paint the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as 
contradictory to the motifs cemented into collective memory by Vietnam War 
photography. There are many celebrated photographs that present an overly-
sentimentalized cult of the soldier, which deliberately subverts notions of the soldier as a 
tragic character in favor of the view of the soldier as a compassionate and selfless hero. 
This is the second meaning of photonationalism, photographs used to condition a mass 
mindset, and to cultivate nationalism and solidarity in spite of precarity and death. Before 
delving into the photographs any deeper, some explanation is needed to explain 
embedding policy because it had a significant affect on the mobility of photographers.  
 
1.2 “Embedding” Photojournalists 
 Photojournalists documenting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were not granted 
the kind of unfiltered access that photojournalists were in Vietnam. After abundant 
criticism for the heavy-handed censorship during the first Gulf War, government officials 
settled on what was billed as a less-restrictive policy. Photojournalists who wanted to 
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document the conflicts were required to be embedded within a group of soldiers or 
stationed at a press base in a capital city. Unlike the photographers of the Gulf War, these 
men and women were granted real time access to the conflicts as they unfolded. 
However, soon after this policy was put into place it drew wide criticism for influencing 
the content of the news images. 
 Embedding photographers and journalists with troops in Iraq came first as a relief. 
Precious few had been granted access to the war in Afghanistan and many were thankful 
for the doors that were being slowly opened in Iraq, confident that similar policies would 
follow in Afghanistan. In 2003, a Los Angeles Times media critic was one of the vocal 
supporters of the embedding policy, insisting that journalists and photographers were 
being granted “a rare window on war.”5  
 As photographs began to emerge in the news, biting criticism was levied at 
embedded journalists and at the policy in general. Many journalists were deemed unable 
to capture the war in a fair and balanced light because they were presumed to suffer from 
a kind of “Stockholm syndrome.”6 The suggestion that embedded photojournalists 
inevitably suffer from a kind of Stockholm syndrome insinuates that the objectivity of 
their lens had been compromised by their consistent point of view.  Since embedded 
photojournalists are guarded by a specific group of soldiers for a long period of time, they 
grow attached, and they can no longer report on them in an unbiased manner. Of those 
who remained in stalwart opposition to embedding policy, Alex S. Jones, director of 
                                                      
5 As quoted in Sherry Ricchiardi. “Close to the Action.” American Journalism Review. 
(College Park: University System of Maryland Foundation, 2003) Online. Accessed 17 
January 2012. http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=2991. 
6 Andrew Lindner. “Among the Troops: Seeing the Iraq War Through Three Journalistic 
Vantage Points.” Social Problems, Vol. 56, No. 1. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2009): 24. 
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Harvard’s Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy is a 
paradigmatic example. He critiqued the content produced by embedded journalists, 
suggesting that it was propagandistic and that it appeared to be “one magnificent 
recruitment video” for military life.7 
 On some level, a consistent point of view is to be expected of photojournalists. 
The dominant subjects of war photographs produced by embedded journalists are no 
different. Predictably, embedded war photographers predominantly feature the soldiers 
with whom they are on assignment. This subject alone is not new. The soldier has been a 
popular and recurring character in the history of photography. From Crimea to the World 
Wars, during Vietnam and still today, photographs of soldiers in combat give the public 
relatable persons though whom the war experience can be filtered and to whom 
compassion can be bestowed. However, the positive connotation of recent war 
photographs warrants interrogation. 
Mike Kamber and Tim Arango have connected the positive swing in combat 
photographs, as well as the absence of photographs of American casualties in the Iraq 
War, directly to embedding policy. Likewise, they have reported that the absence of 
particularly damning photographs stands in direct contrast, and perhaps even in reaction, 
to coverage of the Vietnam War:  
If the conflict in Vietnam was notable for open access given to journalists –  too 
much, many critics said, as the war played out nightly in bloody newscasts – the 
Iraq war may mark an opposite extreme: after five years and more than 4,000 
American combat deaths, searches and interviews turned up fewer than a half-
dozen graphic photographs of dead American soldiers.8 
                                                      
7 As quoted in Ricchiardi. “Close to the Action.” 
8 Mike Kamber and Tim Arango. “4,000 U.S. Deaths and a Handful of Images.” The New 




In this report, Kamber and Arango note several instances when the photography of the 
dead or dying led to expulsion of the responsible photojournalists from their embed. The 
official reasons given for the expulsions were often cloaked in bureaucracy. Nonetheless, 
the intentions of military officials to control the content of the images is obvious. For 
example, Robert Nickelsburg was forbidden to work in military zones in Iraq after 
publishing a photograph of a soldier who, though not dead at the time of his 
photographing, died later of his wounds. Nickelsburg was expelled for breaking the 
embed rule of not obtaining written permission from the wounded soldier.9 
While embedded with the U.S. military himself, Kamber was not just unable to 
photograph certain scenes because of military censorship. Susan Roa reported of one 
incident where Kamber was reprimanded on site for photographing a tragic scene: 
One day during his time embedded, Kamber’s unit was attacked by an IED. After 
a quick recovery from the debris, Kamber began to photograph but the unit 
captain yelled out to him “no pictures!” Kamber replied, “I’m here to do my job 
and you can take my cameras later.” The U.S. military later warned the New York 
Times not to publish the photos and also threatened to revoke the paper’s embed 
access. Mr. Kamber and his editors dug through the images from that day and 
tried to conform to the military’s requirements. The graphic images were left 
unpublished.10 
 
With situations like those Kamber described and experienced, it is evident that the 
government and U.S. Military learned the lessons of the Vietnam War with regard to war 
photography.   
 
                                                      
9 Kamber and Arango. “4,000 U.S. Deaths…” 
10 Susan Roa. “Mike Kamber: Military Censorship.” BagNewsNotes.com Online. 14 
October 2012. Accessed 24 April 2012. http://www.bagnewsnotes.com/2010/10/mike-
kamber-military-censorship/. 
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1.3 Photography, Public Opinion, and Political Ideology 
Frequently, photographs of soldiers function metonymically, standing in for the 
wars themselves. This is one of the reasons some photographs are called iconic – an icon 
as a representative symbol. They characterize war and soldiers in general. Ideologically 
speaking, this photographic metonymy is ripe for appropriation by whichever political 
group finds the content particularly apt. Very plainly speaking, this is how photographs 
of soldiers committing ethically reprehensible acts in Vietnam after the Tet Offensive 
began to serve the anti-war cause, as if the photographer’s themselves were incognito 
activists.  
 Even when photographers are in the right place at the right time, historic events 
do not always yield historic photographs. However, it might be correct to say that historic 
photographs do stir historic sentiments. Photojournalism is not necessarily at its most 
powerful and its most historic when it acts as a window into a unique and yet-unseen time 
or place. It is also powerful and historic when it acts as a mirror, accurately reflecting the 
identity of the society that employed it for facticity and meaning. Or, as Barbie Zelizer 
has put it, when photographs connote as well as denote. 
 If one were to accept briefly that photojournalism was hinged directly upon public 
opinion, one would expect the content produced during the Vietnam War and the Iraq 
War to be consistent. Why? The Vietnam War and the war in Iraq shared a similar 
dramatic decline in public opinion well before the wars ended. Afghanistan has a 
different story. Gallup poles show that until recently the public felt that the U.S. was 
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justified in its continued presence in Afghanistan. 11 In Iraq on the other hand, public 
opinion dropped dramatically as early as 2005. This rate was even faster than the decline 
of public support for Vietnam in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s.12 The opposition to the war 
in Vietnam became a majority in August of 1968, and continued steadily upward through 
the war’s end.  
 The relationship between the emergence of particularly damning photographs of 
war is the inverse of what might be expected from the comparison of public opinion. 
When public opinion began to sour on the Vietnam War in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, 
sensational photographs cropped up as well, as if the photojournalists felt a responsibility 
to reinforce those sentiments. What are the iconic photographs from Iraq and Afghanistan 
that would match the fervor of protest? Arguably, there are none from Afghanistan. The 
Abu Ghraib archive was accidentally revealed and curbed the support of a large majority 
of Americans. Yet that was a different case entirely. Casual snapshots are not the product 
of photojournalists looking for news. It is well known that neither the war in Iraq nor the 
war in Afghanistan has been without blemishes, even when Abu Ghraib is excluded from 
consideration. 
 In the August 11, 2011 issue of the New York Times Sunday Review, William 
Deresiewicz asked explicitly what I am implying. Although he confessed to sincerely 
doubting there has been an Iraqi equivalent to the massacre at My Lai, he cited a few 
instances of gross American war misconduct:  the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, the gang 
                                                      
11 Jeffrey Jones. “New High Call Afghanistan War a Mistake.” Gallup. Online. 03 
August 2010. Accessesd 01 December 2011. http://www.gallup.com/poll/141716/new-
high-call-afghanistan-war-mistake.aspx. 
12 Frank Newport and Joseph Carol. “Iraq Versus Vietnam, a Comparison of Public 
Opinion.” Gallup. Online. 24 August 2005. Accessed 01 December 2011. 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/18097/iraq-versus-vietnam-comparison-public-opinion.aspx. 
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rape at Mahmudiya, and the civilian massacre by the 5th Stryker Brigade. What did he see 
as the difference between these three atrocities? “Only the first (Abu Ghraib) has been 
widely discussed, likely because there were pictures. How many more of these have there 
been? Maybe none, maybe a significant number: until we ask – until we want to ask – 
we’ll never know.”13  
 Deresciewicz is on to two important things here. First, that there are cases of gross 
war “misconduct,” and second that they are only recognized as such when there are 
images. Images of atrocity are especially threatening to idealistic metanarratives that 
purport a clean and moral war because they directly contradict it. As Dereciewicz 
implies, when we see some images of atrocity, even if they are few in number, we are 
able to assume that they are just the tips of the iceberg. The war in Iraq was marred with 
incidents that were caught on the personal cameras of those involved and were thus 
outside of the long arms of government and big media regulation. This is not really the 
case with Afghanistan. Although the absence of atrocious images does not necessarily 
account for the public support for a war, the presence of images of atrocity can account 
on some level for its lack of support. However, the question returns, whether we can 
blame embedding for this ostensible absence. 
 The relationship between photographs and the public is neither univocal nor is it 
unidirectional. While the content of certain photographs may have an influence on the 
public’s interpretation of events like war, the public’s interpretation of events likewise 
affects how the content of photographs is viewed. Such is the case with photographs that 
                                                      
13 Deresiewicz, William.  “An Empty Regard.”  The New York Times Sunday Review, 




depict soldiers. While soldiers metonymically signify war, war often inadvertently 
characterizes soldiers. 
 
1.4 Organization and Methods 
 If the message of the photographs from the Vietnam War can be interpreted as 
consistently anti-war, how are images from Iraq and Afghanistan to be interpreted? The 
story has been overwhelmingly one of liberation – gallant hero soldiers enduring 
hardships, becoming victims themselves to release the innocent from the grip of despotic 
rule. While photographs from the Vietnam War remind us continually of the 
meaninglessness of war, photographs from Iraq and Afghanistan frequently harken back 
to the war’s impetus; it’s emotionally wrought, entirely justifiable purpose. Most fall 
tragically in line with the official nationalistic mindset cultivated by “Support our 
Troops” rhetoric.   
The following section, SYMBOLIZING EVIL - VIETNAM, will go into 
greater detail about how conflict photographs from the war in Vietnam imagined war 
metonymically via the image of the soldier. I will discuss the dialectics of content and 
connotation that made these photographs anti-war photographs. I will further argue that 
photographic metonymy functions in two ways: while photographs of soldiers negatively 
characterized the war, the war also negatively characterized the soldiers. 
 In the third section, INVENTING HEROES – IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, I 
will delineate the different ways in which the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were 
photographed as “not Vietnam.” With Afghanistan, I will analyze photographs produced 
by embedded journalists that harken back to the impetus of the war (something Vietnam 
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notoriously lacked), 9/11, and the changed connotation of victimization in those 
photographs. I will analyze embedded journalists’ photographs of the war in Iraq that 
point to the goal of the war, its anterior limit – the rescue of the helpless Iraqis from the 
tyrant Saddam Hussein, and the making of hero soldiers. I will pay specific attention 
throughout to images that are totems, rallying points that recall an archaic sense of 
patriotism, and those that are taboo. 
 In conclusion, I will consider the relationship between the two alternative 
problems of photography exemplified by the two historical periods discussed (the 
Vietnam war, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan). I will address the ethical problems 
inherent in a medium that assumes the mantle of objectivity, and I will approach the 
question of responsibility when it concerns taking and showing photographs. 
 Throughout, I treat photographs as artworks. How can I do this? Photographs that 
end up on the front pages of newspapers do not get there solely by virtue of the events 
they depict. Choices are made – first by the photographer when he or she shoots the 
images, second by the editor who picks from all the images shot, third by the viewing 
public who celebrates certain images more than others. All these choices are influenced 
by the myriad of iconography, connotation, style, tone encapsulated in the images – in 
short, these are aesthetic choices, the same kind of choices made by artists who use more 
traditional art media to communicate. For these reasons, I interpret the photographs in 
terms of their iconography, composition, and their political function separate from the 
actual events they depict. 
 I have organized the following chapters based firstly upon the topics I wanted to 
cover, and secondly upon chonology. So in that sense, I am writing firstly about 
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photography, and I am concerned primarily about how the qualities of photography and 
the politics of war affect the interpretation of images. Throughout, I also draw parallels 
between language and photography. I do this through word choice, using words like 
“tropes,” “metonyms,” “signifiers,” and “rhetoric” to encourage the reader to understand 
photographs as visual constructs with meaning rather than as records of events. I also 
compare specific, often vulgar, photographs to the specific, often vulgar, language of 
pundits in order to further call into question the notion of unbiased photography. 
 There are profound differences between the way photographs were presented to 
the public during the Vietnam War and the way photographs are presented today. The 
primary means of image consumption during the 1960s and 1970s were print media and 
television. Today we have a third means that often trumps the other two – the Internet. In 
order to maintain a consistent criteria, I limit my discussion to images that were printed in 
nationally reputable publications. For those images that I discuss as “iconic,” I consulted 
three archives which contain award winning photographs from the years of the Vietnam 
War all the way through to today: the World Press Photo archive, the Picture of the Year 

















CHAPTER 2. SYMBOLIZING EVIL – VIETNAM: THE (UNINTENDED?) 
POWER OF PARTICULARLY DAMNING IMAGES 
Just as the events of the Vietnam War forever altered the American understanding 
of war, the images from the Vietnam War established a previously-unexpected visual 
system. The iconic photographs from Vietnam stand now as a historical turning point 
where previously there was none. If the invocations of the Vietnam War signal disdain, a 
shameful pockmark on the face of American history, what then does the image of the 
Vietnam War signify? How do the photographs of the Vietnam War haunt 
photojournalism and American culture? 
 War has never been clean or pretty. Gunther Lewy has argued that the Vietnam 
War was not dirtier or uglier than conflicts in the past. In one example, he reminded us 
that napalm, a source of many Vietnam horror stories, was simply a more advanced use 
of fire, which itself was an ancient weapon of war.14 On one level, the fact that these 
photographs brought horrors that were common on the battlefield to American’s 
breakfast tables made them exceptional.  
 War is an ethically ambiguous practice. Most people would consider it foolish to 
assume that Vietnam was the first war with so-called collateral damage. What made this 
collateral damage utterly despicable in Vietnam was the confluence of special 
circumstances that existed in the climate of the American understanding of the war. 
Young Americans in the prime of their lives were being drafted to a tiny country in 
Southeast Asia to fight a war against the specter of the time – the specter of communism. 
However, this combination of a lack of real and tangible threat, coupled with the fact that 
                                                      
14 Guenther Lewy. “Vietnam: New Light on the Question of American Guilt.” 
Commentary, 65, no. 2 (February 1978): 49. 
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so many Americans were dying for it, 
created a volatile climate. So, when 
photographs published in newspapers 
depicted the shameful acts of war rather 
than pride-inspiring acts of heroism, they 
only served to further galvanize public 
opposition to the conflict. 
 If 1965 was the year when 
America’s political leaders made their full 
commitment to the war in Vietnam, it was 
also the year when the protest movement 
fully came together.15 Prior to 1965, public 
opposition was isolated to fringe activists 
and relatively ineffectual demonstrations. 
But as more troops were harvested from 
their homes to occupy the jungles of South 
Vietnam, the many who opposed the war found a more legitimate voice. Nancy Zaroulis 
and George Sullivan, in their detailed chronicle of the protest movement, mark 1965 as 
                                                      
15 By May of 1965, there would be 50,000 American troops on the ground in South 
Vietnam. This dramatic increase was an attempt by Lyndon Johnson to “get things 
bubbling” after Vietcong aggression earlier in the year. Part of this ramped up aggression 
was the Rolling Thunder campaign advocated by National Security Advisor McGeorge 
Bundy. Rolling Thunder was a plan of continuous helicopter bombardment of the North 
Vietnamese encampments. See James S. Olsen and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino 
Fell: America and Vietnam. Revised 5th Edition. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006): 
128. 
Fig. 1 - Co Rentmeester, Getty Images, 
October 1966 
Fig. 2 - Unattributed, 1944 
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the moment of the watershed because “the events of that year contained all the elements 
for the drama that would be played again and again in the next seven years.”16 
 
2.1 Standard Photographs 
 In many ways, and for much of the war before the Tet Offensive in 1968, 
photographs that were published by major news magazines conformed largely to the 
standard and predictable illustration of war. What is a so-called standard photograph? 
Can there be such a thing? Photographs depict events that by their very definition are 
unique to a time and to a place. But are all “events worthy of their name?”17 
 Consider Co Rentmeester’s October 1966 photograph of General Westmoreland 
inspecting the soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division (Fig. 1) against the iconic photograph 
of Lieutenant General George S. Patton reviewing his troops in 1944 (Fig. 2) near the end 
of World War II.  Each depicts exactly the same type of “event:” the unity of the troops 
under the direct supervision of their highest ranked superiors. They are pictures of 
military might. They feature the strength of the numbers and the attentiveness of military 
leadership. They are the overwrought scenes in epic war movies when the heroic leader’s 
voice hurls an inspirational battle cry to the innumerable and excitable masses.  
                                                      
16 Zaroulis and Sullivan: 67. 
17 “What is an event worthy of this name? And a major event that is, one that is actually 
more of an event, more actually an event than ever?  An event that would bear witness, in 
an exemplary or hyperbolic fashion, to the very essence of an event or even to an event 
beyond essence? For could an event that still conforms to an essence, to a law or to a 
truth, indeed to a concept of the event, ever be a major event? A major event should be so 
unforeseeable and irruptive that it disturbs even the horizon of the concept or essence on 
the basis of which we believe we recognize an event as such.  That is why all the 
“philosophical” questions remain open, perhaps even beyond philosophy itself, as soon as 
it is a matter of thinking the event.” Giovanna Borradori. Philosophy in a Time of Terror: 
Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2003): 90. 
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  There are a few things worth noting in this photograph of Gen. Westmoreland. 
First, Westmoreland stands taller than everything else in the composition, even though a 
dramatic perspective does not overtly exaggerate his height. Second, the rigid dynamism 
of the verticals points to Westmoreland’s thick forearm and fist. If this were a painting, it 
would be easy to assume that the artist was deliberately using these compositional 
devices as an allegory for Westmoreland’s masculine power as a general. Lastly, all the 
arms of the soldiers mirror Westmoreland’s. They share the rigidity and strength of his 
convictions. In this case, compositional devices project the image of an omnipotent 
commander, and the literal and figurative strength of arms. 
 In hindsight, we can recognize 
these as easily decipherable symbols, 
even naïve implications, considering 
the current historical understanding 
of the war in Vietnam. Some of the 
most significant military failures in 
Vietnam were directly related to the 
rigid structure and hierarchical 
organization that is accentuated in 
this photo. The jungle landscape and guerrilla enemy prevented a fortified assault by the 
kind of regimented troops that are congratulated in this photograph. In today’s light, the 
normalcy of this photograph speaks to a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of 
the Vietnam War in its early years. 
Fig. 3 – Horst Faas, Associated Press, 1966 
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Another example is Horst Faas’ photograph of Gen. Westmoreland talking with 
troops near Ben Hoa in 1966 (Fig. 3). This is also a very standard photograph from the 
Vietnam War with respect to the history of war photographs. It participates in the 
common illustration of the common characters of war, fulfilling commonly accepted 
roles. Some might even go as far as to say that these are cliché photographs of war. They 
give no real context; they establish nothing exceptionally unique to time or even to place. 
They show the ways in which the Vietnam War was just like every other war. 
 These photographs, like the others, with our present day historical understanding, 
read as almost farcical. Westmoreland is discussing the war with ground troops here. The 
leaders of the war effort in Vietnam frequently considered reports from the troops 
negligible, and by the late ‘60s were roundly and routinely criticized in the press for that 
fact. In today’s light, the normalcy of this photograph represents a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of the Vietnam War in its early years 
rather than an accepted trope of war. Photographs that attempt to 
posit clichés of war onto actual wars misrepresent their nuanced and 
specific characters. That misrepresentation is fairly easy to see in 
cliché war photographs.  
 As early as January of 1968, the problematic fictions told to 
the public by the government were beginning to crumble. The now-
notorious Tet Offensive was in full swing by the end of the month 
and Americans had suffered too many casualties in attempting to 






hold back the Vietcong guerillas, who, by the January 31, had already temporarily 
overrun the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.18 The paradoxical logic employed by U.S. military 
reports showed itself. Associated Press Correspondent Peter Arnett reported the 
oxymoron employed by an anonymous major to defend U.S. strategy: “It became 
necessary to destroy the town to save it.”19 Even prior to the major swing in public 
opinion, certain photo essays were subtly prescient of public sentiments to come. As 
LIFE Magazine put it recently, the photographers in Vietnam 
in the early 1960s were able to “[anticipate] the scope and the 
dire, lethal arc of the entire war in Vietnam.”20 
 
2.2 Exceptional Photographs 
 In one significant respect, many photographs broke 
from those simple, “standard,” conventional clichés of war 
photography even before 1968 by depicting the soldier as 
emotionally unprepared rather than stable and gallant.21 
Consider the photograph of Lance Corporeal James C. Farley at the end of a photo essay, 
One Ride With Yankee Papa 13, shot for LIFE Magazine by Larry Burrows (Fig. 5). 
There is no solidity here, no rigid strength of form to insinuate a rigid strength in 
                                                      
18 Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan. Who Spoke Up? American Protest Against the 
War in Vietnam, 1963 – 1975. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co, 1984): 150 
19 As quoted in Zaroulis and Sullivan: 151. 
20 “Larry Burrows’ Classic Photo Essay: One Ride with Yankee Papa 13.” LIFE 
Magazine. Online. 2012. Accessed 19 March 2012. http://life.time.com/history/one-ride-
with-yankee-papa-13/#1. 
21 Looking back to the now-famous photograph of the youngest soldier who fought in the 
American Civil War, 10-year-old Johnny Clem still appears well suited for the task 
despite the probability of his emotional immaturity (Fig 4). 
Fig. 5 - Larry Burrows, 
LIFE Magazine, 1965 
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convictions like photographs of soldiers taking aim or regiments marching. Instead, there 
are collapsed diagonals – broken forms and despair. 
 Despite the fact that this was a conscientious and realistic portrait series of Farley, 
it still paints him as contrary to the archetypical soldier. He is shown as neither gallant 
nor brave, but instead as a child who, psychologically at least, does not belong in a war 
zone. This treatment of Farley speaks as a metaphor for the conflict at large. Americans 
prematurely rushed into a foreign country and were ill prepared for the type of war they 
were to encounter. Burrow’s photographs of Farley personified this embarrassing 
circumstance. 
 A misconception about photographs of the 
Vietnam War is that they were exceptional simply 
because they depicted sadness, violence, and even 
the mangled bodies of the dead as opposed to hope 
and glory. However, the difference isn’t simply a 
matter of polarity between positive photos and 
negative photos. Sadness, violence, death, despair – 
these have long been themes of photography, and 
most photographs exhibiting these themes aren’t 
considered exceptional or iconic. In fact, rather than 
standing as metonyms for war, they were considered profane because they seemed to 
disturb the sanctity of death, or the honor of a soldier.  
 LIFE Magazine was permitted by government censors to print photographs of 
dead enemies (and dead Americans only a year later) as early as 1943, a quarter century 




before the My Lai massacre.  Robert Morse’s photograph of the screaming skull of the 
Japanese soldier (Fig. 6) is the only photograph of an enemy dead that comes close to 
being culturally significant, and that cultural significance only has to do with the backlash 
from publishing the image that forced LIFE to defend its policy to disturbed readers. 
LIFE received letters from readers complaining about Morse’s photograph, and 
responded, “War is unpleasant, cruel, and inhuman. It is more dangerous to forget this 
than to be shocked by reminders.”22 
 One important difference between photographs of the Vietnam War and 
photographs from previous wars was how the photographs presented death and pain – in 
the moment rather than after the fact. To partially explain this, Susan Moeller has made 
the connection between photojournalists working in Vietnam and the popularity of the 
street photographer aesthetic of the 1950s and 1960s practiced by Robert Frank, Lee 
Freidlander, and Gary Winograd: “Instead of careful compositions isolating decisive 
moments of combat, the images that seemed to dominate and characterize the bulk of the 
photographs from Vietnam appeared simply to arrest randomly selected scenes – random, 
yet all the more significant for their seeming representativeness precisely because they 
were ‘random.’”23 Although ultimately tainted by the photographer’s subjectivity, shot-
from-the-hip photographs are perceived as more authentically objective because of the 
lack of control over the image. The content is interpreted as being untainted by the 
photographer’s intentions precisely because the photographer snapped the photograph 
spontaneously and without deliberate forethought.  
                                                      
22  “Letters to the Editors,” LIFE Magazine. 22 February 1943, p. 8. 
23 Susan Moeller. Shooting War: Photography and the American Experience of Combat. 
(New York: Basic Books, 1989): 407. 
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 Eddie Adams’ famed photograph of Gen. Loan executing the Viet Cong prisoner 
(Fig. 7) is the quintessential photograph of the event being captured in the moment, rather 
than after the fact. It is the frozen 
moment, the mystical property of 
photography typified. This is not a 
photograph of death as an 
accomplished fact. It is a 
photograph of certain and 
impending death and of the agony in 
knowing death-is-to-come, but not 
yet. It was a specific event, an ugly event, and it was also a celebrated icon capable of 
characterizing the Vietnam War in general, despite its specificity. Why? 
 This face of death was self-reflective for much of the viewing public.  It was as if, 
like Narcissus, they had finally recognized themselves in the image of the execution.  
They were horrified as the knowledge of their prolonged impotence was realized. When 
Thierry De Duve wrote of this photograph that viewer’s experience was traumatic not 
because of the depiction of violence, but because of the “paradoxical conjunction of the 
here and the formerly,” he meant that the viewer experienced being “always be too late, 
in real life, to witness the death of this poor man, let alone to prevent it; but by the same 
token, always be too early to witness the uncoiling of the tragedy, which at the surface of 
the photograph, will of course never occur.”24 
                                                      
24 Theirry De Duve. "Exposure and Snapshot: The Photograph as Paradox." October 5 
(Summer 1978): 121. 
Fig. 7 - Eddie Adams, Associated Press, 1968 
 
 23 
 When looking at this photograph contemporaneously, the slippage to the symbolic 
was inevitable. The viewers were too late to stop the violence of war in general, yet were 
frozen in hellish ineptitude and were 
unable to realize the true nature of its 
crisis, mirroring their inabilities to 
affect or accept the Vietcong’s 
demise. At this point in 1968, 
experiencing the fallout from the Tet 
Offensive, Americans were at once 
passionately hopeful that they could 
make the war end, and hopelessly 
unable to end it. The same is true 
with all of those photographs that 
broke from precedent to symbolize 
Vietnam – they became iconic, 
because they mirrored and reinforced 
a preexisting public sentiment. 
 Another important way that 
Vietnam War photographs broke from precedent is that these images functioned in the 
sphere of culture. The photographs of the piles of dead from the aftermath of the Dresden 
bombings during WWII (Fig. 8), when published in the postwar world, drew cries of 
Fig. 8 - Unattributed, German Federal Archive, 
1945 
Fig. 9 - Art Workers Coalition, And Babies 
poster based on the photograph by Ron 
Haeberle, 1970 
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outrage and accusations of indecency.25 Photographs from My Lai on the other hand 
successfully made the massacre a cause célèbre for those who would condemn the war, 
despite their vulgarity. They were coopted as propaganda art.  
Even in their time, the photographs from My Lai were quickly associated with 
timeless indictments of war. Shortly after the release of the photos, the Art Workers 
Coalition appropriated Ron 
Haeberle’s photograph from My Lai 
to act as a protest poster (Fig. 9). 
Frazer Dougherty, Irving Petlin, and 
Jon Hendricks designed the poster to 
illustrate a quote from an interview 
with CBS’s Mike Wallace and Paul 
Meadlo, a soldier who had taken part 
in the massacre. Hovering above Haeberle’s image of the bodies of Vietnamese peasants 
in the road, the poster reads “Q. And babies? A. And babies,” indicating that not even the 
very young were spared from the brutality. The Museum of Modern Art had promised to 
fund the posters, but the board reversed the their decision at the last minute in an effort to 
avoid the Vietnam War polemic. In protest, the Art Workers Coalition printed the posters 
with the help of the lithography union, stormed the museum, and displayed and 
distributed the posters beneath Picasso’s Guernica (Fig. 10).26 
                                                      
25 For a recent example, see Luke Harding. “German historian provokes row over war 
photos.” The Guardian. Online. 21 October 2003. Accessed 03 April 2012. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/oct/21/artsandhumanities.germany 
26 M. Paul Holsinger. War and American Popular Culture. (Greenwood Publishing 
Group, 1999): 363. 
Fig. 10 - Unattributed, Associated Press, 1970 
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 Photographs, in this way, are very tricky. There are two levels of trust that the 
public puts into photographs. One is in their denotation, the event depicted – that what is 
depicted is what had been as Roland Barthes famously termed it, and that the referent is 
actually what is signified by the photographic sign. However, the other contradicts the 
first almost entirely. Content frequently yields to connotation.  The content of a 
photograph can be deemed untrustworthy. Perhaps for example, it excludes some 
significant factor from the frame. Nonetheless, the connotation attributed to that 
misleading content is frequently trusted, lasting.27 
Eddie Adam’s photograph of the Vietcong execution is a prime example of the 
influence of connotation. Throughout his life, Adams felt he had framed the content in a 
way that led the viewer to sympathize with the wrong soldier. Margot Adler of National 
Public Radio explains in an article eulogizing Adam’s life and career that he 
considered himself a patriot and a Marine, [and] never came to terms with the 
fact that the anti-war movement saw that photograph as proof that the Vietnam 
War was unjustified. In fact, he believed to the end of his life that the picture 
only told part of the truth. The untold story was that on the day of the execution, 
an aid to Loan was killed by insurgents. After Loan pulled the trigger, he walked 
by Adams and said, “They killed many of our people and many of yours.”28 
  
 On the surface, the impact was positive because photographs from the Vietnam 
War helped to quicken the end of a war that cost countless lives. The impact is 
nonetheless problematic because when a photograph is translated from the specific, 
detailed, and eventful to the general, universal, and connoted; nuances are lost in the 
process of interpretation just as they were in cliché photographs.  The thing depicted – 
                                                      
 
28 Adler, Margot. "The Vietnam War, Through Eddie Adams Lens." NPR.org. March 24, 
2009. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102112403 (accessed April 
06, 2011). 
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soldiers as unsoldierly –  also 
connoted war as horrible.  In the 
process of making a generalized 
interpretation, there is also a laying 
of blame, and an implication of 
responsibility. If we see that war is 
horrible because we see soldiers 
committing unsoldierly acts, it must be the soldiers 
who are making the war horrible. What is cut out of 
this circular reasoning is of utmost importance. 
 We consistently see the soldier-as-unsoldierly 
trope when looking at the celebrated, iconic 
photographs that illustrate the Vietnam War. In 
addition to being the year that marked an increased 
American military presence in Vietnam, 1965 was 
also defined by the first destruction of Vietnamese 
peasant hamlets by systematic burning. As these 
ethically questionable activities began, they were 
reported through the character of the soldier. Peter 
Arnett’s photograph of the U.S. paratrooper walking away after torching a straw hut (Fig. 
11) is interesting because of the paratrooper’s cold, emotionless expression as he walks 
away from the flames. It represents the lack of consciousness with which operation 
“Scorched Earth” was executed.  
Fig. 11 - Peter Arnett, Associated Press, 1966 
 
Fig. 12 - Kyochi Sawada, 
United Press International, 
1966 
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 Similarly, Kyoichi Sawada’s photograph of a U.S. armored vehicle dragging the 
body of a Vietcong enemy through the streets (Fig. 12) is marked both by the horrible act 
and the soldiers who seem un-phased by the brutality of their behavior. The photograph, 
often called “Dusty Death,” was taken in Tan Binh in late February of 1966 and was 
awarded a first prize for news in 1966 by World Press Photo. Tan Binh was not the site 
of a brutal struggle or a climactic battle in the war. The soldiers were sent there to build a 
road under operation “Rollingstone.” They met opposition, but it was quickly squelched. 
 These soldiers took the site in the battle of Suoi Bong Trang on February 23 and 
24. U.S. and Australian troops clashed with Vietcong guerillas, and, in keeping with 
typical Vietcong tactics, most of the Vietcong retreated into the wilderness once the 
fighting became heated. American casualties numbered 11, with 74 wounded, while the 
Vietcong lost at least 142 fighters.29 Sawada snapped the photo in the aftermath of this 
battle. The Vietcong never attempted to retake the site, choosing instead to simply annoy 
Americans with occasional sniper and mortar fire. The road was completed by the 
beginning of March.30 Without diminishing the gravity of the loss of lives, it is safe to say 
that this was a relatively routine and successful endeavor. At the very least, it was not the 
kind of endeavor that would warrant an especially acerbic animosity from the Americans.  
 And yet, Sawada’s photograph shows U.S. soldiers unabashedly dragging the 
body of a Vietcong enemy through the street. Any image of a dead body speaks on some 
level to the horrors of war, but when this dead body is seen in conjunction with the 
soldiers nonchalance, the effect is even more chilling. The responsibility for perpetuating 
                                                      
29 John Carland. Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966. 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 2000): 179 – 180. 
30 Carland. Combat Operations…: 179 – 180. 
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this kind of brutality falls on the two 
men driving the armored vehicle, 
regardless of their actual role. In the 
photograph, the parading of the corpse 
appears completely unwarranted. The 
armored vehicle looks large enough to 
tow a car, and it seems impractical to 
move a body in this way. The only 
conclusion left for the viewer to draw 
from this photograph is that these 
soldiers are needlessly violent and 
inhumane. 
 The same is true of Nick Ut’s 
famous photograph of the naked, 
napalm burned Kim Phuc from 1972, 
much later in the war (Fig. 13). The 
presence of the strolling soldiers behind 
the panicked children are what make the photograph an image of lapsed ethics and not 
just an image of a war horror. Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites share my 
diagnosis that the presence of indifferent soldiers in the image changes its rhetorical 
value. Of Ut’s image, they wrote 
The message is clear: what seems, from looking at the girl, to be a rare experience 
sure to evoke a compassionate response, is in fact, as experienced by the soldiers, 
something that happens again and again, so much so that the adults involved 
Fig. 13 - Nick Ut, Associated Press, 1972 
 
Fig. 14 - James Haddock, Kim Phuc and 
other Vietnamese flee napalm (Trang Bang, 
Vietnam, 1972), Digital C-Print, 2000 
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(whether soldiers there or civilians in the United States) can become indifferent, 
morally diminished, capable of routinely doing awful things to other people. 31 
 
For these reasons, they find that the image of the napalmed girl strikes at a national nerve. 
While the uncensored rawness of the girls scream is jarring to the viewing public, the 
soldiers are featured as callous to her cries. The meaning of this photograph is interpreted 
and politically polarized based on the context. 
 John Haddock, an American digital artist, completed a series of so-called 
screenshots in 2001 that reconstruct historical events as if they were being played in a 
video game. His reconstruction of the events depicted in Ut’s photograph also stresses the 
presence of the carefree soldiers (Fig. 14). Where the composition of Ut’s photograph 
features Kim Phuc prominently, his screenshot from above allows the soldiers to 
dominate the frame. Hariman and Lucaites read the reconstructed image as Phuc running 
from the soldiers rather than from the pain of her burns.  
 
2.3 Assigning Blame 
 By 1972 when Ut’s image was taken and published, the public no longer had 
illusions about the direction the war had taken. The protest movement had become a 
prominent element in national news, especially since the Kent State shooting in May of 
1970. But even before that, because of the worldwide protests in 1968, the American 
news media had shifted coverage to predominantly negative sentiments.  Daniel Hallin 
noted that up until 1967, the press and the pro-war government rarely clashed. He found 
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Public Culture, and Liberal Democracy. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007): 
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that not only was the media relatively “docile,” but that official positions on the war 
dominated the headlines.32 After 1968, however, coverage had shifted to “growing 
divisions in Washington, declining morale among American troops in the field, and the 
spread of the antiwar movement into parts of the political mainstream.”33 
 It is hard not to look at any photograph from the Vietnam War as an anti-war 
photograph. Even at their most innocuous, a sense of hopelessness or futility lies behind 
photographs taken during the war in Vietnam. They are retroactively colored by the 
tainted cultural memory of the war. That tainted cultural memory is not just contingent 
upon the facts and results of the war, but upon images of war that portray it at its most 
egregious. These particularly damning photographs were not just inevitably connoted; 
they were also inevitably problematic. As the Winter Soldier Investigation attempted to 
clarify, soldiers were often unjustly blamed for the war crimes of the administration. 
Since the images functioned metonymically, the soldiers themselves signified and 
embodied the unjust nature of the war, and often were made to unfairly bear the burden 
of the war’s legacy upon returning.  
 This inappropriate blaming of the soldiers was noted by the press before the 
publication of what became the iconic photographs of Vietnam, but it did not stick until 
most of those major and damning photographs were published. This perception, this 
laying of blame, was not necessarily a situation that existed in a direct and causal way, 
but was rather assumed to exist by the polemicists battling for public opinion. The 
soldiers were involved because of the central position of the image of the soldier in the 
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debates about the ethicality of the war. On one hand, soldiers did not appreciate being 
used. On the other, the anti-war movement was portrayed as being against the soldier. 
 “It became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it.” That particular 
sentiment would become utterly vile to most when news of the My Lai massacre broke in 
1969. The event took place a mere two months after the anonymous Major’s assessment 
of Ben Tre. My Lai matched the memorable quote’s rhetoric with a more direct and 
blatant application of its implied strategy: to save the peasants from the tyranny of 
Hanoi’s communism, they must be slaughtered.  
 My Lai has become notorious only because of the photographs taken by U.S. 
Army Photographer Robert Haeberle. The story of the events that took place at My Lai 
was initially unheard until LIFE Magazine published Haeberle’s images after they 
surfaced in the Cleveland Plain Dealer some 18 months later.34 During the Tet Offensive 
back in May of 1968, the Charlie Company had been sent into what they thought was a 
stronghold of enemy combatants in an area of the Quang Ngai province, named 
“Pinkville” by the U.S. military. When the soldiers arrived and found only civilians, they 
slaughtered them – an estimated 350-500 people. 
 The photographs are unique specimens because they provide such a 
comprehensive record of the carnage. But again, the photographs did not just depict the 
aftermath of violence. It is important to note that the photographs were of soldiers caught 
red-handed as agents of that violence.  Haeberle didn’t just photograph the now-infamous 
bodies in the street that was appropriated by the Art Workers’ Coalition for their And 
Babies poster. Interspersed among the graphic images of slain civilians are photographs 
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of soldiers acting destructively. As the 
number of bloody bodies in the photographs 
increased, images of soldiers are slipped in 
between, showing them ravaging the village 
(Fig. 15). One photograph features two 
soldiers dumping domestic possessions into 
a muddy ditch. Another shows a soldier 
lighting the grass roof of a domicile on fire. 
A third pictures a soldier dramatically 
hurling round thatched mats into the already 
burning structure. The last and possibly most 
disturbing image is of the soldiers in the 
Charlie Company enjoying a break after the 
destruction of the entire village.  
 Historian James Olsen remarked that these photographs have become 
“ubiquitous” in that they “symbolize evil.”35 Images like these alter the identity of the 
soldier in American culture’s collective memory. The soldier as a character is obviously 
no longer a hero fighting for American ideals. Moreover, the soldier was not even an 
ineffectual and unprepared child, like Farley in Burrow’s series. He has become, for 
Olsen and others, the personification of the evils of war rather than the embodiment of its 
glories. 
                                                      
35  American Experience: My Lai.  DVD.  Directed by Barak Goodman. (Public 
Broadcasting Service, 2010). 
Fig. 15 - Page 4 of the Cleveland Plain 
Dealer, November 20, 1969 
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 When John Smail, one of the squad leaders of the Charlie Company who was 
responsible for the events, overheard the news break about My Lai, he feared for his 
safety. The patrons of the bar in which he was sitting were screaming “fucking baby 
killers” at the television.36  This image conjured by Smail became a common trope in the 
final years of the war and in the years that followed. In the case of specific soldiers like 
Smail who had committed those crimes, they were coopted to symbolize the despicable 
qualities of the war at large. Keith Beattie, in The Scar that Binds, ties the cultural 
understanding of the veteran with wild violence (exhibited in such movies as Taxi Driver, 
1976, and Rambo: First Blood, 1982) because “[since] the violence at My Lai was so 
excessive – so outside acceptable or accepted boundaries (even in war), and was therefore 
determinably insane, [it] opened the way for a further demonization of the veteran as 
mentally deranged and psychotic.”37 The soldier’s reputation in general, on some level, 
was utterly despicable, since he or she was held responsible for all of the atrocities shown 
photographically in the news. This was problematic for two reasons.  
 First, attacks levied did not discriminate. Regardless of whether an individual 
actually participated in such crimes, he or she was often hastily blamed for the horrors of 
war in general.  Mike Cook, one of the veterans featured in the documentary Vietnam: 
Homecoming (2007), remembers being harassed excessively upon returning back to the 
U.S., despite being innocent of any serious war crimes:  “When we drove out [of] the 
gate, there were people yelling and screaming and throwing crap at the bus – I mean 
literally crap at the bus.  You could hear them yelling and screaming, and it wasn’t 
‘welcome home,’ it was ‘S.O.B.,’ ‘babykillers.’  They told us when we debarked the bus, 
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‘Don’t tell anyone where you came from, keep it to yourself. Go home and enjoy your 
family.’”38 The protesters in this case attacked Cook as if he were the problematic aspects 
of the war incarnated before their very eyes. 
 This hostility is something that at least a number of soldiers returning from 
Vietnam experienced as justified. Others, however, experienced the hostility as 
unjustified because they were condemned based on a misplaced assumption. The problem 
with this hostility and symbolization was not just that some soldiers were 
mischaracterized as violent when they were guilty of no wrongdoing. The problem is that 
others, namely government and military officials responsible for giving the orders to the 
soldiers to commit violent acts, were not held responsible in part because they avoided 
becoming symbols in the public eye of wrong doing. 
 For three days in Detroit in 1971, the Vietnam Veterans Against the War held a 
forum discussing precisely this unbalanced assignment of guilt. The New York Times 
reported on the conference, calling attention to the general sentiments of the forum. 
About 100 veterans showed up to confess that they had frequently witnessed what would 
be called war atrocities: the torturing of soldiers, the killing of civilians, and the 
mutilation of corpses.39 They, however, did not feel they should be held responsible for 
such actions, because the military leadership designed the strategy that perpetuated these 
kinds of activities. “We’re passing the buck and a certain number of the cents of that 
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dollar belong to us,” said Kenneth Campbell, “but the people who make the policy should 
be the first to burn.”40 
 Second, despite the fact that many activists rallied around images like those from 
the My Lai massacre, most people within the anti-war movement were not specifically 
against soldiers, and actual incidents in which soldiers shared Cook’s experience were 
few. Some of the most fervent supporters for withdrawal from Vietnam were those who 
had been there to witness the events first hand. However, that did not stop politicians, 
activists, and news organizations from arguing their position with the soldier’s embattled 
identity in mind. This is the second problematic aspect of photographic metonymy. The 
officials who were actually responsible for perpetuating the continued hurtfulness of war, 
those who gave the orders for destruction of villages and burning of hamlets, had a 
scapegoat, and it was a scapegoat they could successfully defend. 
 On one level, it should not be surprising that many came to conflate the 
inhumanity of war with the inhumanity of those who took part in it. In so many of the 
iconic images from Vietnam, the American soldiers, or more often their South 
Vietnamese allies, are implicated in the ethically-questionable actions or outright 
atrocious acts. Since soldiers have always been associated with war, they became the 
body politick upon which the ethicality of the war was argued.  Nonetheless, the 
relationship between photographs and the public that commends or disparages them is not 
simple or consistent. 
 The nuances of the issue were not lost on U.S. Vice President and war proponent 
Spiro Agnew. In April of 1971, Agnew made a speech at the 25th anniversary meeting of 
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the Veterans Administration Volunteer Service. Selections from that speech were 
reproduced in the Wisconsin State Journal.  In that speech, Agnew said that war critics 
were unjustly criticizing American soldiers.  He not only said that this criticism was 
unwarranted. Agnew also went as far as to say that these critics were “demoralizing 
Americans on the front lines.”41 As if in deliberate reinforcement of the pro-war U.S. 
government’s attempt to align itself against the anti-war movement via condemnation of 
its supposed demonization of soldiers, the facing page reports Lt. Calley’s remarkably 
light sentence for his part in the orchestration of the My Lai massacre – a point of heated 
contention among war protestors. 
  This critique of the anti-war movement may have been hypocritical, but was 
nonetheless quite effective. It was hypocritical because the U.S. government notoriously 
neglected Vietnam War veterans after the war, so they defended the respectibility of the 
soldier in rhetoric only.42  The critique was effective because it exposed the war protest in 
                                                      
41  “Agnew Lashes ‘Negative’ Critics of War Effort.” Wisconsin State Journal. 04 April 
1971: 4. 
42 Numerous news agencies reported that veterans were being forgotten by the 
government agencies that were supposed to honor and care for them after they committed 
and sacrificed themselves for the national cause. In 1973, as Kissinger’s drawdown was 
taking place and veterans were returning home, they found themselves already forgotten, 
or perhaps not-yet-remembered—the level of compensation they were promised for their 
efforts was nowhere to be found. Peter Breastrup reported “The Veterans Administration 
spends only 15 percent of its $12 billion budget on ex-GIs who actually served in 
Vietnam, shortchanging them on education, jobs, and drug help.”  Likewise a Newsweek 
correspondent reported “Vietnam vets are hoeing a tougher road than their counterparts 
from any American war in this century.”  TIME, in keeping with this trend wrote, 
“Veterans of World War II returned to a grateful, generous country that was about to 
embark on an unprecedented quarter-century of prosperity. Korean War veterans cashed 
in on much the same rising curve of material benefits. Viet Nam vets, by contrast, are the 
dubious beneficiaries of the nation's immediate troubled past and uneasy future.”  See 
Peter Breastrup. “Viet Combat G. I.'s Held Shortchanged.” The Washington Post. 04 
March 1973, “The Vets: Heroes as Orphans,” Newsweek. 05 March 1973., 
“VETERANS: Forgotten Warriors?” TIME Magazine. 12 March 1973. 
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general as depending largely upon the image of the soldier as tragic and malignant, all the 
while deflecting the critique away from the higher levels of command. 
 In an article for the November 17, 1969 issue of the New York Times, Nan 
Robertson approached the very point of potency in Agnew’s claims: are wounded pro-
war veterans embittered by war critics? Robertson interviewed several veterans 
recovering from their wounds at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.43 She characterized 
them as proud and appreciative of the experience of war for maturing them. She also says 
that these same men she interviewed largely felt no hostility towards the anti-war 
movement. While none truly agreed with the anti-war movement’s message, most felt the 
protesters were in some way honoring the soldiers’ sacrifice. One veteran, Staff Sergeant 
Barry Baron, went as far as to say, “One reason we are fighting in Vietnam is so that 
people can have long hair and beards and protest the war in Vietnam.”44 While there is 
factual merit to instances of the veterans being harassed by the anti-war protestors, the 
inflation of its prevalence into a binary of pro-war veterans/anti-veteran protestors is 
nonetheless a distortion.  
 Interestingly, Robertson found that the thing about which these men felt most 
insulted was a more officially-sanctioned rhetoric of war protest. Captain Corbin Cherry, 
a chaplain in the war, was quoted as saying, “I’m with that lady that promises to sue the 
moratorium if they read her son’s name again. Thousands and thousands of parents who 
lost children don’t appreciate their names being read.”45 Apparently, these veterans did 
not really find either particular polarization of ideology demoralizing or despicable, be it 
                                                      
43 Nan Robertson. “Wounded Unembittered by War Critics.” The New York Times. 15 
November 1969. 
44 Robertson. “Wounded Unembittered by War Critics.”  
45 Robertson. “Wounded Umembittered by War Critics.” 
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left wing protest or right wing 
warmongering. They did, 
however, find the practice of 
utilizing the war dead to make 
points about the ethicality of war 
to be reprehensible. 
 The opinion of those 
soldiers casts projects like LIFE 
Magazine’s “One Week’s Dead” 
in an entirely different light (Fig. 
16). Although the editors of LIFE 
made an attempt at impartiality 
while claiming that they could “not speak for the dead,” the intention of showing the 
portraits of hundreds of men who had died during the week of May 28-June 3, 1969, was 
obviously aligned with a kind of humanistic argument for withdrawal from Vietnam. If 
this was not evident in the pages of “One Week’s Dead,” it was easily divined from the 
testimonial immediately following, which recounted the story of one such photograph as 
symbolic of a “broader tragedy.”46 While the warmongering right appropriated the 
disgraced veteran as a symbolic tool to define the war in its terms – as slowly derailed by 
lack of support and eventually sabotaged by outright resistance, the protesting left 
coopted the war dead to illustrate the scale of what they considered a tragedy. In either 
                                                      
46 Unattributed. “I see death coming up a hill,” TIME Magazine. June 27, 1969: 32. 




case, the soldiers are usurped into a 
struggle of ideology that 
mischaracterizes them for political 
gain. 
 While certainly the 
photographs cannot be perceived as 
solely responsible for the 
subsuming the soldier into the body 
politick in the aftermath of Vietnam, we cannot underestimate the role of Vietnam War 
photographs in shaping images like Mike Kamber’s – photographs of soldiers threatening 
the photographer with weapons (Fig. 17). No soldier wants to be the poster boy for the 
brutality of war. Since the photographs from Vietnam, it is not hard to see a heightened 


























CHAPTER 3. INVENTING HEROES – IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: 
PHOTOGRAPHY’S TOTEMS AND TABOOS 
After scanning the public photo archives of the US Department of Defense for 
weeks, bloggers Norman Beierle and Hester Keijser discovered a silly trend: 
Apart from the relative invisibility of the “enemy” combatants, the wounded and 
the dead—after all, we are staring at the corporate face of the DoD—a number of 
categories start to present themselves quite naturally. Among them, I found the set 
of sunset soldiers probably one of the most puzzling ones. The army has a great 
love for the silhouetted image.47 
 
It should come as no surprise that these photographs, and ones of similar picturesque 
quality, were the ones to wind up on the U.S. Department of Defense website.  It would 
be foolish to browse the public face of the military looking for anything less than a 
romanticized picture of military life. All of these images are free to download at high 
resolution, sowing advertisements for the military into the hard drive of whoever on the 
Internet finds the images worth downloading.  
 Mishka Henner, in his explorations of the U.S. Department of Defense website, 
finds other somewhat expected trends in the archives, exposing what he called a “sphere 
of legitimate aesthetics” through which the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are being 
presented: “Empire Sunsets (or what Beierle and Keijser called sunset soldiers),” “The 
Friend (soldiers extending their hands to children),” and “The Healer (military doctors 
treating sick civilians).”48 All of these images, even at first glance, render a pleasant and 
                                                      
47 Norman Beierle and Hester Keijser. “Sunset Soldiers.” Mrs. Deane. 24 February 2011. 
Accessed 07 November 2011.  http://www.beikey.net/mrs-deane/?p=4845. 
48 As quoted in David Campbell. “Vietnam, Afghanistan and the sphere of legitimate 
aesthetics: developing a critical photographic practice.” David Campbell: Photography, 
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agreeable image of U.S. soldiers and of the counter insurgency conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Again, this is not a surprising discovery. 
 What should be a surprising discovery is the fact that these trends continue when 
the search is shifted from the official propaganda of the U.S. Department of Defense to 
the photojournalism of some of the major news organizations in the western world. The 
archives of most major news organizations seem to follow these same trends of 
romanticizing soldier life. This attitude is altogether desirable for those who would seek 
public approval of the wars. But for those seeking a legitimate reportage of context to the 
wars, a “legitimate sphere of aesthetics” is hardly convincing as an objective record. 
What is the “legitimate sphere of aesthetics” in photojournalism with respect to the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what is its relationship to Vietnam War photography? 
 Throughout almost the entire wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been a 
continuous desire on the part of the press and politicians to draw the comparisons among 
the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. There are certainly very obvious similarities. 
Both the Vietnam War and the war in Afghanistan were counter insurgency conflicts in 
pre-modernized countries. As I indicated in the introduction, both the Vietnam War and 
the Iraq War share an arc of public opinion, particularly with respect to the introduction 
of atrocity photographs. But with respect to photojournalism, the Vietnam War and the 
recent wars in the Middle East are not very similar. 
Much of the iconic photography that brought us tragic visions of the Vietnam War 
was a result of the freedom granted to photojournalists to roam about Vietnam relatively 
unencumbered. Eddie Adams characterized his experience in an interview reproduced in 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Multimedia, Politics. 13 May 2011. Accessed 07 November 2011. http://www.david-
campbell.org/2011/05/13/vietnam-afghanistan-aesthetics-critical-photography/. 
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the film “An Unlikely Weapon.” He said, “There was a hardcore group of people in 
Vietnam. Especially photographers, who have probably seen more war than any soldier 
or any general, and I don’t care who they are…We would go to all the battles.”49 
 Contrast those words for a moment against Rick Loomis’ words, a photographer 
from the LA Times who shot the wars Iraq and Afghanistan. He said, at a World Press 
Photo conference at USC Annenburg, “The front line, or as the Marines like to call it, the 
tip of the spear, would change from day to day…One day, you think, okay here I am, it’s 
the front, and it seems dangerous…and the next day you see boats going by on semi-
trucks, and you think this can’t be the tip of the spear, where am I now?...It’s totally 
unknown to you, because once you’re in with a unit, you’re in and you don’t have a lot of 
mobility.”50 What Loomis is describing here is the Pentagon policy of embedding 
journalists with certain groups of soldiers for their protection, discussed above as 
responsible for the so-called photojournalistic Stockholm syndrome. 
 The American soldier is indeed a well-established character in the history of 
photography.  But the problem with this character is that, after Vietnam, the soldier fell 
from grace. It was not simply because soldiers during the Vietnam War were sometimes 
pictured as a malignant presence, blindly muddling problems that were not their own. It 
was also because, long since all the photo opportunities in Vietnam had ended, the 
American soldier has been used to tell the unfavorable story of the Vietnam War. Since 
the tragedy of the Vietnam War became associated with the face of the soldier, the image 
                                                      
49 Susan Morgan Cooper, dir. An Unlikely Weapon: The Eddie Adams Story. Morgan 
Cooper Productions, 2009. 
50 Rick Loomis. “The Iraq War, Iraq: One Year Later, Making Choices.” (presented at the 
World Press Photo Panal Discussion Images of Crisis, Crisis of Images at USC 
Annenburg.) January 13, 2005. 
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of the soldier was problematic for those who would seek to tell a favorable story, to 
garner support for the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 As I suggested with the example of the Sunset Soldiers, many of the photographs 
from Iraq and Afghanistan overcompensate for the negative image established by the 
Vietnam War; the Sunset Soldiers deliberately romanticize soldier life for fear of 
inadvertently condemning it. In Vietnam, photojournalists were able to accurately reflect 
declining public support of the war with images that were increasingly critical of war 
practices. However, the legacy of these maligning images lingered.  Policy that was 
inspired by that legacy prevented embedded photojournalists in Iraq and Afghanistan 
from being able to accurately reflect and cater to the waning public with regard to the 
ethics of those wars.  
 When considering the course of the Vietnam War and the kinds of images that 
were produced as anti-war sentiments grew, it is evident that the photographs shared a 
symbiotic relationship with the movement. Critical images were created in a climate of 
dissent, and then, by their existence in the cultural milieu, fomented further dissent. 
When the “Support our Troops” cult of the soldier rhetoric emerged at the onset of first 
the war in Afghanistan then the Iraq War, it reads as an attempt to prevent criticism of the 
war via the actions of the soldiers – practices that were widely used in the Vietnam era. I 
consider the term Sunset Soldiers, in this light, as a euphemism for the overwhelmingly 
generic and congratulatory photographs that flood the newspapers from the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. 
 Many of the photographs from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan share 
iconographical similarities with the more everyday photographs from Vietnam. One 
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theme, for example, from all three wars was the 
wounded soldier – the soldier as victim. This 
theme was explored by Burrows in One Ride with 
Yankee Papa 13, as discussed in the previous 
section.  The idea of these photographs is that we 
relate to the war through an empathetic reaction to 
the transgressed subject. When we look into the 
faces of the troubled soldiers, we experience their 
emotion mirrored onto us.  
 This is why most of the iconic images from 
the Vietnam War were considered anti-war 
photographs. The photographs’ content were 
organized in such a way that they encouraged the viewer to relate to characters who were 
supposed to be our enemies. That is the case with Ut’s photograph of Kim Phuc. When 
soldiers were pictured, they were cold and amoral.  The photographs that often did depict 
the soldier were tragedies, like One Ride with Yankee Papa 13, and cultivated 
hopelessness, which revealed an anti-war stance. Henri Huet’s photograph of the two 
soldiers with head bandages during a battle in the Central Highlands in January of 1966 is 
another such photo (Fig. 18). The wounded soldiers reach out like zombies in abjection 
and despair. 
 Perhaps part of the reason why photographs of wounded soldiers in Vietnam 
appear to express a sense of hopelessness and meaninglessness is because there was no 
real initial trauma to justify their presence in Vietnam. This is, of course, not the case 




with the war in Afghanistan. Marvin and Deborah Kalb wrote that presidents before Bush 
II were reluctant to enter into a so-called “boots on the ground” conflict because, since 
Vietnam, they feared the emptiness of morale that followed when hardship was endured 
without legitimate motivation. But, like Dick Cheney said, everything changed after 9/11. 
President Bush took 9/11 as the ultimate justification to enter a foreign war. “You’ve got 
to take 9/11 and smack it down right in the middle of it, it was the 
dominant…development that overwhelmed everything.”51 Until 9/11, American war 
policy had been especially tentative. But afterward, Marvin and Deborah Kalb suggested 
that the Bush administration felt they could “no longer shilly-shally through a crisis. It 
could no longer lose another war. It could no longer be humiliated. It had to be tough, and 
if challenged, it had to meet the challenge and emerge triumphant for the world to see.” 52 
 As the Kalbs’ language implies, in order to try and escape the Vietnam War’s 
dreadful historical wake, the Bush administration employed a strategy and rhetoric of 
inflated bravado. This is the initial source of what I have called the cult of the soldier, or 
what Jeff Stein termed the “Hero Syndrome.” He noticed that the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, like Vietnam, are counter-insurgency conflicts, and are conducted as a 
systematic liquidation of enemy combatants, necessarily outside the eyes of the public. 
The killing is just too vicious. Retired U.S. Army Major John Nagle has remarked that 
the U.S.-run Kill/Capture missions that dominate the offensive in the Middle East is 
“almost an industrial-scale counter-terrorism killing machine.”53 Jeff Stein, after relating 
                                                      
51 As quoted in Marvin and Deborah Kalb: 204 
52 Marvin and Deborah Kalb: 205. 
53 Dan Edge. Dir. “Kill/Capture.” PBS Frontline. Transcript. Online. 14 October 2011. 
Accessed 30 November 2011. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/afghanistan-
pakistan/kill-capture/transcript/ . 
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Kill/Capture to the Phoenix program during Vietnam, reminded the reader that 
“counterinsurgency doesn’t lend itself to Homeric heroes…victories are short, dirty, 
ambiguous, morally questionable, and often inconsequential. From the muck of the war 
on terror, heroes have to be invented.”54 Photography can be used to “invent heroes” just 
as it “symbolized evil” in Vietnam. 
 It is important at this point to distinguish between the Iraq War and the 
Afghanistan War. The war in Afghanistan was initially meant to oust the Taliban 
government that implicitly supported terrorism by refusing to hand over Al Qaeda leaders. 
After the Taliban was removed from sovereignty, the war in Afghanistan became a 
counter-insurgency operation, preventing a Taliban coup against the Karzai 
administration, while searching out Taliban and Al Qaeda guerillas and bases in the 
countryside.  The war in Iraq was meant to liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam 
Hussein’s dictatorship, while locating and destroying his alleged weapons of mass 
destruction. However, the war in Afghanistan has been dramatically more popular than 
the war in Iraq. Gallup poles show that until recently the public felt that the U.S. was 
justified in its continued presence in Afghanistan. 55 In Iraq, on the other hand, public 
opinion dropped dramatically as early as 2005, at a rate faster than the decline of public 
support for Vietnam.56 
                                                      
54 Jeff Stein. “Beyond the Hero Syndrome: Why the initial accounts of the bin Laden raid 
had a familiar sounding spin.” Bookforum. Volume 18, Issue 02. (New York: 
ARTFORUM International Magazine, 2011): 7. 
55 Jeffrey Jones. “New High Call Afghanistan War a Mistake.” Gallup. Online. 03 
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 Where the Iraq War was aimed 
at a clearly definable photographable 
menace (Hussein), the war in 
Afghanistan had more in common with 
the war in Vietnam in that the enemy 
was diffuse. With the Vietnam War and 
the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. was 
battling abstractions – with the Vietnam 
War, the insidious disease of Soviet Communism in the jungles of Southeast Asia, and 
with the war in Afghanistan, the threat of terror in the foothills of the Middle East. 
However, unlike both the Iraq War and the Vietnam War, the war in Afghanistan had an 
initial cause to underscore the necessity of war: 9/11. It could be suggested that Osama 
bin Laden was the target, but bin Laden was not as substantial a figure as Hussein, simply 
because after 9/11 with a few minor (video) exceptions, he seemed to disappear into the 





Arguably the most iconic photograph to emerge out of the immediate post-9/11 
stage of the war in Afghanistan was Tyler Hicks’ photograph of the Taliban execution 
(Fig. 19). The exceptional thing about Tyler Hicks’ photographs of the U.S. and Northern 
Alliance effort to oust the Taliban from their strongholds in Afghanistan in 2001 was that 
Hicks sensed the impending war after 9/11 and made it into Afghanistan before the 
Fig. 19 - Tyler Hicks, The New York Times, 
2001 
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borders were closed.57 That means he was able to enter the country without being subject 
to an embed, and before his photographs were required to be inspected by unit 
commanders. 
 Hicks’ photograph captures vengeance in the moment of execution. It could be 
compared to Eddie Adams photograph of Gen. Loan. However, where Loan appeared to 
kill with a cold indifference, the Northern Alliance fighters killed with a heated, almost 
fetishized desire for the enemy’s blood.  These elements of fetish and desire are pictured 
in the energy of the executioners who almost hungrily fire guns into the lone Taliban 
soldier. These sentiments are reified and accentuated by the Taliban resistor’s naked legs. 
The scene may be of an execution by firing squad, but it reads like a gang rape, right 
down to the bloodied pants hanging around his ankles. 
 Hicks’ photo series, the images from which culminated in depicting the execution 
of the Taliban soldier, won a World Press Photo award in 2001, just like Adams’ 
photograph did in 1969. However, despite the poignancy of both photographs, Hicks’ 
photograph eerily matched the aggravated pro-war sentiments because of its proximity to 
9/11 and the heightened rage of national discourse in 9/11’s wake. Where Adams’ 
photograph cultivated disdain for war and matched the anti-war rhetoric, Hicks’ 
photograph matched what Jasbir K. Puar called the “eager proliferation of homophobic-
rascist images” in America after 9/11, some of which appeared in New York only days 
                                                      
57 In an interview with Brian Lockhart, Hicks said that after 9/11 he predicted the 
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after the attacks “depicting a turbaned 
caricature of Osama bin Laden being 
anally penetrated by the Empire State 
Building.”58 
 The presence of a first cause, a 
first impetus in the form of an event 
(9/11) that justifies reactionary 
violence and even the pain of 
sacrifice, is what distinguishes not 
only this photograph from its 
historical counterparts from the 
Vietnam War, but many other more 
standard photographs as well. The 
events of 9/11 interrupted the 
historical understanding of 
photographs with a renewed, reversed context just as photographs from the Vietnam War 
subverted the image of the soldier into a renewed, reversed context.  
 Despite the few dead bodies pictured in photographs from 9/11, there were many 
photographs of live bodies taken that exemplify traumatic victimhood. This is the case 
with the photographs of men and women watching the events of 9/11 unfold, teary-eyed 
and glued to the nearest television. They reaffirm and justify the emotional response to 
the tragedy by appearing to objectify the condition of mourning. They show the viewer of 
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Fig. 20 - Mike Yoder, Journal World, 2001 
Fig. 21 - Tim Hetherington, Sleeping Soldier 
Doc Kelso, 2007 
 
 50 
the photograph to himself or herself through the face of the other, exemplifying the 
uniting, grief-affirming similarities. 
The photograph acts as a mirror. It 
says, yes, you and I are the victims of 
9/11. 
 As compared to the images of 
shocked 9/11 mourners (Fig. 20), it is 
clear that the victimizing mirror format 
in general was not an isolated 
iconographical or compositional theme 
in photographs of the war in 
Afghanistan after the embedding policy 
went into effect. While images at once 
reaffirmed the same bravado that the Bush 
administration harnessed from the backlash 
of 9/11, they also confirmed that the 
wounds of 9/11 were still fresh. In order to 
justify war, it must both appear winnable 
and just. Bush’s “dead or alive” mantra, 
like Toby Kieth’s punch line, “we’ll put a boot in your ass, it’s the American way,” 
reinforce the sentiment of winability, while the slogan that christens 9/11 remembrance 
celebrations, “never forget,” keeps the wounds open. While the specter of Vietnam 
Fig. 22 - Cover of the April 02, 2006 issue of 
the Los Angeles Times featuring a photograph 
by Rick Loomis 
Fig. 23 - James Nachtwey, TIME 
Magazine, 2011 
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lingers in images as an overcompensation attempting to avoid the prospect of losing, 9/11 
haunts them with a kind of ceaseless victimization of these so-called heroes. 
 Most demurely perhaps, this is seen in Tim Hetherington’s Sleeping Soldiers 
(2007-8) series from his trip into the Korengal Valley of Afghanistan, through which he 
portrays the American soldier not as a valiant and patriotic champion, but as a fragile 
child enduring grave hardship – a victim of some unknown nightmare (Fig. 21). 
Nonetheless, unlike Burrow’s photographs 
of Farley, these photographs picture the 
soldier as unassumingly heroic in that they 
are victims of necessity, avenging 9/11 in 
spite of the psychological pain they incur 
as a result. While they depict victimhood, 
this victimhood is not without hope. These 
images are tinged with an optimistic 
heroism. 
 In a much more physical way, the 
victims of enemy violence are pictured in 
Rick Loomis’ series called Lifeline (2006), 
which he produced for the Los Angeles 
Times (Fig. 22).  The images are graphic; 
most are bloody.  These soldiers were 
seriously wounded in Afghanistan, and the 
only thing that seems to make them tolerable to the viewer is the vitality left in their eyes, 
Fig. 24 - Louie Palu, The Toronto Star, 
2011 
Fig. 25 - Tyler Hicks, The New York 
Times, 2011 
 52 
as if the American spirit can never die. In the end, these are pictures of Americans who 
are, yes, wounded, but more importantly are overcoming the hardships of the war with 
state of the art medical technology.   
 The consistency and monotony of these kinds of soldier images is ostensible. 
Michael Shaw, of BagNewsNotes.com, points out how three of the industry’s best 
photographers were sent by three of the world’s largest news organizations to get 
photographs that give context to the war in Afghanistan. What was the result? Each 
organization published nearly the same photograph, from the three different 
photographers within two weeks (Fig. 23 - 25). “Not to 
take anything away from the thoroughly accomplished 
James Nachtwey, Louie Palu, and Tyler Hicks, but what 
does it tell us that TIME, The Toronto Star, and The 
New York Times all offered us powerful, dramatic, and 
overlapping photo-stories of U.S. medevac teams saving 
U.S and Afghan lives via helicopter ‘missions of 
mercy.’”59  These images have historical matches. Photo 
archives from the war in Vietnam are peppered with 
helicopter rescues as well as soldiers receiving medical 
treatment. Beyond that similarity, there are differences.  
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Fig. 26 - Cover of the April 
16, 1965 issue of LIFE 
Magazine featuring 




 Compare Tyler Hicks’ 
photograph to one of Larry Burrows’ 
from One Ride with Yankee Papa 13, 
which ran on the cover of LIFE (Fig. 
26). The soldier in Hicks’ photograph 
confidently reassures the viewer that 
everything is a-okay even though 
someone was hurt. On the other hand, 
Burrows photographed Farley in a moment of weakness, exhibiting fear and insecurity. 
So in one instance, the Hicks photograph is an image of victimization because one of the 
characters appears to be badly wounded. But more importantly, front and center is his 
rescuer, acting heroically in the time of tragedy. If there was a frame when Burrows 
caught Farley in a moment of confidence, it didn’t make it to print. Likewise, if Hicks 
photographed this unnamed soldier in a moment of fear, it did not make the cut. This is a 
complete ideological reversal. 
 A number of other photographs share this encouraging, a-okay mentality without 
being so boisterously heroic. One of the most celebrated photographs from the war in 
Afghanistan was taken by David Guttenfelder in the Korengal Valley.  Of the photograph, 
David Dunlap writes on The New York Times photography blog that while looking over 
the top searches on The New York Times website for the week of May 18, 2009, 
“something strange popped up in the No. 10 position: pink boxers.”60  This photograph, 
                                                      
60 David W. Dunlap. “Behind the Scenes: Man in the Pink Boxers.” The New York Times 
LENS Blog: Photography, Video, and Visual Journalism. Online. 21 May 2009. Accessed 
Fig. 27 - David Guttenfelder, Associated 
Press, 2009 
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which graced the cover of The New York Times’ printed edition, features Specialist 
Zachary Boyd standing alongside two other soldiers (Fig. 27). All three soldiers are 
aiming their rifles into the mountainous landscape from behind a barricade, but only two 
of the soldiers are fully dressed. Boyd is pictured wearing only a red t-shirt, his helmet, a 
backpack, and a pair of pink “I Love NY” boxer shorts.  
 This image is significant beyond its levity. It pictures the soldiers living very 
normal lives even though they are at war. Despite being at one of the most dangerous 
military bases in Afghanistan, Boyd still finds himself able to lounge around in his 
underwear. This ability to lounge is reassuring because although the soldiers are being 
fired upon, they still on some level are pictured enjoying the comforts of home. Not to 
mention the fact that the print of 
his underwear reminds the viewer 
for the reason why Boyd must 
wake up early to fire his gun in 
Afghanistan: 9/11. 
 This casual representation 
of the goings on in the Korengal 
Valley is also a bit misleading 
considering the reputation of the base. The Korengal Valley is relatively isolated from the 
other military bases in Afghanistan, and it sits between two mountainous ridges occupied 
by the Taliban insurgents. The base, Restrepo, is set in the very center of this valley, 
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Fig. 28 - Erik de Castor, Reuters, 2011 
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along an old mujahedeen trail.61  Sebastian Junger wrote that the valley “is widely 
considered to be the most dangerous valley in northeastern Afghanistan” and that “men 
have been shot while asleep in their barracks tents.”62  Boyd clearly was able to avoid this 
danger despite his level of comfort. Regardless, the tone of the photograph suggests the 
ease and comfort of a Sunday on the couch rather than a firefight in the most dangerous 
valley in Afghanistan. 
 John Lucaites sees a similar sentiment in the often-published photographs of 
soldiers practicing good hygiene. Erik de Castro’s photograph features a soldier next to a 
large and powerful automatic weapon brushing his teeth (Fig. 28). Lucaites writes that 
“such soldiers might be stationed 
far from home and under less-
than-normal circumstances, their 
lives may be at risk and they 
might even be called upon to kill 
or die in the name of God and 
country, but for all of that the 
basic habits of a civilized people 
abide…they feign to suggest that 
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one can fight a war and still maintain clean 
hands.”63  Again, beyond levity, this photograph 
reminds us that American levels of comfort still 
remain in the Taliban-infested jungle. When 
seen against Larry Burrows’ photograph of 
wounded soldiers lying in muck, the ideological 
orientation of the photographs are apparent. The 
sense of grimy hardship has been sterilized from 
most depictions of the war in Afghanistan. 
 The civilian casualties and maimings 
resulting from so-called precision bombing and 
Kill/Capture missions are consistently absent 
from photographic accounts of the wars despite 
Hamid Karzai’s almost yearly pleas to the U.S. to curtail “collateral” damage.64 Reuter’s 
has published a few of these photographs online over the course of the war; however, 
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Fig. 30 - Unattributed, Department 
of Defense, 2005 
Fig. 31 - Noor Kahn, Associated 
Press, 2005 
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they have never been published in print by mainstream western news organizations (Fig. 
29). The harm done by these well-meaning warriors from the portraits is nearly invisible, 
unclear. Marc Harold, an economics professor at the University of New Hampshire, has 
written extensively on the subject. In a 2006 paper about Afghani civilian casualties, he 
cited two images, one depicting a soldier giving a young Afghan boy a tee-shirt (Fig. 30), 
and another of a younger boy on life support for the wounds he sustained during a U.S. 
precision bombing on his village, Hajiyan (Fig. 31). He wrote:  “Both pictures are ‘true’ 
and neither one alone represents reality. Both illustrate two images of modern war: the 
war to win hearts and minds and the war to kill the enemy. They are inseparable.”65  
 Perhaps the most ubiquitous photographs from the war in Vietnam depicted the 
direct effects and collateral damage from the “war to kill the enemy:” Eddie Adams’ 
photograph of the assassination of the Vietcong prisoner, Nick Ut’s photograph of the 
naked, napalm-burned Kim Phuc, Ronald Haeberle’s photograph of the bodies in the 
street at My Lai. In light of these photographs it is almost obvious why only photographs 
of “the war to win the hearts and minds” currently make it to publication. Each one of the 
previously mentioned photographs from the war in Vietnam was used for propaganda by 
                                                                                                                                                                 
2011. Accessed 17 March 2012. 
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/02/karzais_civilian_casualties_ultimatum, 
“Afghan leader Karzai at ‘end of rope’ over civilian deaths.” The Los Angeles Times. 
Online. 16 March 2012. Accessed 17 March 2012. 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/03/afghanistan-hamid-karzai-end-of-
the-rope.html. 
65 Harold, Marc W. Grab News Headlines, Isolate Bombed Area and Stonewall: U.S. 
Military’s Virtual Reality about Afghan Civilian Casualties. A Case Study of the U.S. Self 




the anti-war movement, most 
notably the My Lai photograph, 
which became the famous And 
Babies poster by the hands of the 
Art Workers’ Coalition. 
 Even though Osama bin 
Laden’s killing maintained this 
precedent of censorship, it 
generated arguably the most iconic image from the war in Afghanistan. That image is 
Pete Souza’s photograph of President Barack Obama with his top advisors in the 
Situation Room during the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound (Fig. 32). In ways, it is 
allegorical of the censorship: the American people all stared at their televisions and 
computer screens waiting for the images, and all they got was a reflection of themselves, 
represented in Souza’s photograph by their elected officials, staring. The composition is 
weighted heavily on the right, but is balanced so evenly on the left by the substantial 
presence of what is seen by the officials, but unseen by us. Even if a closer look is taken, 
perhaps to search for a reflection, a clue about what exactly is outside the frame, all that 
is found are remnants of censorship in the form of chunky pixels. The irony is that 
pixilation is exactly what happens when you get too close to a digital image: it breaks 
down into the same kind of abstraction.  
 Recall Michelangelo Antonioni’s 1966 feature Blow-Up in which the 
photographer, Thomas, investigates his suspicions surrounding some seemingly 
uneventful photographs of a man and woman in a park, only to discover a corpse in the 
Fig. 32 - Pete Souza, White House, 2011 
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bushes.  The closer he gets to the image, the more information it reveals to him, and yet 
the more it degrades into abstraction.  His friend Patricia remarks that the blown up body 
looks like a splatter painting – the implication being that Thomas is perhaps only 
discovering a kind of subjective Rorschach-ian interpretation; he is only seeing his own 
suspicion, anxiety, and victimization gestalted from the non-descript spots. 
 The same is true of the Souza image, and yet no enlargement is needed. Too close 
just comes too soon. The viewer’s murder investigation comes to a startling halt when all 
the clues are found blurred, cropped, and blanked off of the screens. There is no corpse in 
the bushes. The only details that are found reaffirm that no relevant information is 
available. It is almost startling how quickly this image undergoes a fundamental shift 
upon viewing. The image, once considered as a window into the Situation Room, 
becomes a mirror. Where one expects to find information, there is only reflection, 
refraction.  
 Let’s not forget that the Souza image has since been steeped in a bit of 
controversy with regard to what is excluded from the frame. The President and his top 
advisors in this scene are privy to an image that we will likely never see.  The primary 
argument for censorship of the bin Laden death photos and the other photos of the raid on 
the Abbottabad compound was that we would be protected from the hardship those who 
saw the photos and the body itself endured. It was an argument for discretion. The White 
House described the photos as graphically “gruesome,” and was concerned that the 
images would be “inflammatory” if released.66  This argument was presented as a kind of 
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anti-ideology, as if to say, “We are preventing these photos from reaching the public 
because we are not ideological.”  The photographs were painted, in this sense, as tools of 
ideology. The decision to release the photos, by this mindset, would be a decision to 
reinforce anti-Arab sentiment, hidden in the guise of merely providing proof of the 
occurrence of an event. 
 President Obama’s decision to lift the 18-year ban on photographs of American 
coffins returning from war in February of 2009 was deemed disrespectful to grieving 
families and was resurrected in light of the bin Laden censorship controversy. Not 
surprisingly, the objection to the sight of American coffins often came from the same 
direction as those who would release the bin Laden photo. Numerous bloggers, from John 
Miller of National Review to Townhall.com’s Katie Pavich, accused President Obama of 
being soft on terror.  Pavich quipped, “Obama won’t release a single photo of a dead 
Osama bin Laden in order to avoid ‘offending’ the Muslim world, but openly supports 
the idea of photos being taken of our dead troops, killed by our enemies under bin 
Laden.”67 This seems to be the ideological shifting point. 
 CNN’s Anderson Cooper would have it the other way around.  On the very night 
that Americans were told of Osama bin Laden’s death by the hands of U.S. Navy SEALS, 
Cooper broadcast from Ground Zero. In his closing monologue, his message, in 
retrospect, has a very interesting sentiment: remember the victims and soon forget Osama 
bin Laden’s name. He said, while accompanied, perhaps appropriately, by the ceaseless 
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jackhammers of the reconstruction efforts hammering alongside his composed words, 
“We are a country that does not drag the bodies of our enemies through the streets. We do 
not behead them for the entertainment of others. We do not mutilate their corpses. I think 
of his body sinking into the sea, disappearing into the dark depths of the ocean. This man 
who terrorized so many for so long has simply disappeared…there will be no grave 
marker for him.”68  Following this, he showed slides of the American victims of the 
World Trade Center attacks, which easily recall LIFE Magazine’s “One Week’s Dead.” 
 It sure is nice to know that American's no longer drag the bodies of our enemies 
through the streets.  After all, they once did. In fact, it is likely because of the Haeberle’s 
images of the massacre at My Lai, of the bodies of the woman and children and babies of 
our enemies lying in the streets and others like it, that the Vietnam War has become, 
perhaps even for the most boisterous warmongers, a point of shame in American history. 
There is no comparison to be made between the innocent families slaughtered in My Lai 
and the assassination of a mass murderer, who, given the chance, would likely kill again. 
However, this policy of withholding images is not exclusive to the circumstances of bin 
Laden’s demise. There is a pattern of American policy on such matters that demands the 
question: “What would we see if we saw these images?” The question hangs over the 
image of the Situation Room like a dark cloud.  
 As a mirror, the Situation Room image reveals to us a vision of ourselves. We see 
ourselves searching for truth, but also victimized by the idea of the content of that truth.  
With the soldier portraits and other depictions of the victimization of Americans and their 
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“allies,” we look for the truth of the nature of the war, and see only the effects of 
subjective violence.  The effects of violence appeal to our empathy, causing us to see 
ourselves wounded by the very same violence. It is in this way that the very depiction of 
the effects of subjective violence seems, on a basic level, a condemnation of the agent of 
that violence. This process is the refracting nature of victimization in photographs. 
Censorship of images then, by reciprocal logic, would prevent hypothetical empathy for 
the transgressed subject resulting from the experience of the enemy in the photograph-
mirror as the wounded self. 
 This seems to also confer a paradoxical exemption on the enemy. The censorship 
of the images prevented empathy, but also inevitably maintained that the members of the 
American viewing public were victims of a specifically-invisible enemy. First on 9/11, 
Americans were victims of the impossible event occurring, as Jacques Derrida famously 
characterized it: an event that is past once it was realized as possible.69 The tragedy of 
9/11 is partly that the past-ness of it can never be changed, and every photograph 
reaffirmed to us that it would never be part of a present that could be changed or affected. 
We were victims of this perpetual realization through the millions of photographs that 
confronted us following the event of 9/11.   
 Bin Laden could not disappear like Cooper suggested because he never appeared. 
The perpetrator of 9/11 was not a bold and visible threat, but an invisible man, hiding in 
the mountains somewhere in the Middle East. As we plumb the Souza image like Blow-
Up’s Thomas does to his park images, we are still on this very same hunt for physical 
form of the agent of terror. By keeping the death images hidden, the end of this search 
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then also remains invisible, impossible. As we can see in the Souza image, we are still the 
victims. The event that might end the 
perpetuation of this ideology of inevitable 





The mission in Iraq was termed 
“Operation Iraqi Freedom.” This name alone suggested that the marketable angle for the 
war was liberation – the Iraqi people were suffering under a despotic ruler it was our 
responsibility to end their suffering. When the combat in Iraq officially began on March 
19, 2003, without NATO sanctions, President Bush made it clear that Hussein was the 
primary target of the campaign in Iraq. In a televised address a few hours after the first 
barrage of missiles were unleashed, Bush said that “coalition forces have begun striking 
selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein’s ability to wage 
war,” and accused Hussein of placing his “Iraqi troops and equipment in civilian areas, 
attempting to use innocent men, women, and children as shields for his own military.”70 
 The first reinforcement of President Bush’s official narrative came 
photographically very shortly after the invasion of Iraq and the first real battle of the war: 
the Battle of Nasiriyah. On March 29, 2003, after crossing the Rumaila oil fields earlier 
in the week, and then overtaking Nasiriyah, the 1st Marine Division faced the final enemy 
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Fig. 33 - Damir Sagolj, Reuters, 2003 
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resistors. According to MSNBC, “a crossfire on the front lines ripped apart an Iraqi family 
after local soldiers appeared to force civilians toward Marine positions.”71 In the 
aftermath, Damir Sagolj photographed U.S. Navy Hospital Corpsman HM1 Robert 
Barnett cradling a small Iraqi child with 
blood on her sleeve (Fig. 33). The 
photograph was nominated for a Pulitzer 
Prize in 2004, and is one of the more lasting 
examples of the early Iraq War’s invented 
heroes and “patriotic fables.”72 
 When Baghdad was taken over by 
U.S. troops less than a month later, Hussein 
fell as well. Not the actual, living, breathing man, Saddam Hussein – that would come 
later – but instead the totemic Hussein, in the form of a gigantic public effigy. The statue, 
which stood nearly 40 feet tall, was erected in Firdos Square in 2002 in honor of 
Hussein’s 65th birthday. It was pulled down by U.S. tanks on April 9, 2003, producing 
arguably the first iconic images from the Iraq War. I say images because there is not 
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really one definitive image that has stood out among the 
thousands taken from the event (Fig. 34). So many 
images exist because, during the Iraq War, Firdos 
Square was the location of the Palestine Hotel, which 
housed the majority of international press members. 
The spectacle was broadcast around the world. 
 The circumstances of the photographed event 
are symbolic of the official explanation of the war. On a 
Wednesday morning after traveling by tank to Firdos 
Square, Marines discovered several Iraqis attempting to 
topple the statue with a rope, 
identified with their struggle to bring 
it down, and lent them a hand with a 
military crane. This is how Operation 
Iraqi Freedom was billed – the U.S. 
was successfully aiding the Iraqi 
people in a struggle of their own. 
Unlike the early iconic photographs from Vietnam, rather than 
countering the official narrative and naïve assumptions about war, 
this early iconic photograph from the Iraq War reestablished those 
fundamental mischaracterizations.  
 Another great example of a photograph that was of use in 
“inventing heroes” was Luis Sinco’s photograph of Marine Lance 
Fig. 35 - Cover of the 
November 10, 2004 issue of 
the New York Post featuring 
photograph by Luis Sinco 
Fig. 36 – Luis Sinco, Associated Press, 2004 




Corporal James Blake Miller smoking a cigarette during the Second Battle of Fallujah 
(Fig. 35). This photograph is better known as the “Marlboro Marine,” and was featured 
on the cover of the New York Post on November 10, 2004 (Fig. 36), among numerous 
other publications, and was nominated for the Pulitzer Prize in 2005. The New York Post 
headline read “Marlboro Men Kick Butt in Fallujah.” Compared it to Henri Huet’s 
photograph of zombie-like American soldiers in the Central Highlands on the February 
1966 cover of LIFE Magazine, which was captioned a sobering “The War Goes On.”  
Sinco’s photograph and its sentiments share more with shots of John Wayne during the 
production of Sands of Iwo Jima (Fig. 37) than it does with Huet’s photograph of the 
dirty, battle-deranged soldiers fighting the early stages of the Vietnam War. In 2005, 
confidence fully broke in the war in Iraq.  Yet, rather than effectively symbolizing the 
“dire, calamitous arc” of the war to 
come the way photographs like Huet’s 
and Burrow’s would before 1968, 
Sinco’s photograph made LCpl Miller 
“a celebrity poster boy for the U.S. 
effort in Fallujah and a hero in his 
hometown.”73 
 The other poster boy of the 
early-mid war period was Major Mark Bieger, who, like Barnett in the first few days of 
the invasion, was caught in the act of cradling a young Iraqi girl who was wounded by an 
insurgent’s car bomb (Fig. 38). In this situation, the photographer had specifically 
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intended to utilize the photograph to create empathy for the troops. Like many of these 
photographs, the meaning attributed to them is largely determined by the context into 
which they are framed. When war-critics like Michael Moore and Shock Magazine used 
the photograph in an attempt to paint a negative picture of the war (Fig. 39), Michael Yon, 
the photographer who shot the image, launched a massive campaign to have the 
photographs removed. In the case of Michael Moore, who simply posted the photograph 
on his website, Yon threatened a lawsuit for copyright violation.  
 With Shock Magazine, the situation was a little more complicated. The caption on 
the cover of Shock drew on an all-too sensitive comparison: “ON THE FRONT – WAR 
IS STILL HELL! Jarring proof that Iraq is the new Vietnam (their emphasis).”74 Yon 
alleged that Shock used the photograph without permission, but his citation of this 
infringement was not only to protect his legal and monetary rights as a photographer. 
Yon used his legitimate legal rights to enforce what he considered to be an equally 
legitimate claim to the connotation and aesthetics of the image. In an interview with 
Media Orchard, Yon was asked how much his suit actually had to do with his desire to 
strictly enforce his copyright. He replied that his challenge to Shock’s use 
is evenly divided between three points of contention: first, the fact of the 
infringement is a clear cut case of using my property without my permission; 
second, (a) the manner in which the image was used to frame an article that 
denigrates our military, (the polar opposite message from what I contend is 
conveyed by the image) (b) the use of the image in a publication that I think is 
lame, hackneyed, and beneath contempt and (c) the timing of the launch to 
coincide with Memorial Day; and, third, the bad faith HFM demonstrated 
throughout our negotiations.75 
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The interesting questions here are these: What 
determines connotation, or more politically, the 
ideological direction of an image? Content or 
intent? Reader or author? Yon can certainly make 
a claim to the denotation, but can he speak for 
what “is conveyed by the image?”  
 Yon’s background is especially relevant to 
the Shock’s “hackneyed” headline comparing the 
Iraq War to the Vietnam War. Yon served in the 
Vietnam War as one of the famed “Green 
Beret.” The Green Beret themselves were 
one of the few attempts by the military to 
mythologize the Vietnam War into a 
“patriotic fable” of its own.76 Yon’s book, 
Moment of Truth In Iraq, uses his 
photograph of Bieger to communicate 
exactly the opposite message that Shock 
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tried to deliver with the photograph. Of the book, the publisher, Richard Vigilante Books, 
wrote (in praise) “Reading this book is like watching the movie Apocalypse Now, but in 
an alternate universe in which the opposite always happens. Every time our soldiers get 
into an incredibly tense situation…our guys pull it off!”77 
Saddam Hussein was discovered hiding in an underground lair on December 13, 
2003. In this situation, the soldiers who located him did in fact “pull it off.” The 
photograph from this event, which emerged in August of 2004, pictured Saddam as a 
kind of hunting trophy (Fig. 40), lending 
visual support to Major General Ray 
Odierno’s quote from the day:  “He was 
caught like a rat.”78 In the photograph, 
Samir Al-Jassim, an Iraqi-turned-
American who fled Saddam’s regime 
shortly after the Persian Gulf War, proudly, 
yet anonymously, reported to the River 
Front Times that he had “punched Saddam 
in the face.”79  
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 After he was brought in, Saddam was treated to a kind of extreme exposure. The 
image that accompanied the news of his identification and incarceration was the still from 
his dental exam, the video of which was shot by an anonymous military photographer 
(Fig. 41). W.J.T. Mitchell found this image to be a 
resounding victory for Iraq War propagandists for two 
primary reasons: 
First, it defused any hint of cruelty by staging 
Saddam’s captors as looking after his health, 
perhaps determining whether he had 
developed any cavities or abscesses during his 
underground existence, or preventing him 
from committing suicide with a cyanide 
capsule embedded in one of his teeth. Second, 
it suggested that the U.S. military had finally 
achieved the elusive objective of total victory, 
since now it had penetrated “inside the head” 
of the head of state. Any remaining secrets 
would now come to light, and it did not take 
long, in fact, for the image to be reproduced 
with a new caption: “the search for weapons 
of mass destruction continues.”80 
 
This image of the penetration of the head of state, coupled with Bush’s notorious 
“Mission Accomplished” photo-op, cast the Iraq War in a very pointed light. Where it is 
commonly believed that the Vietnam War was an unwinnable quagmire with no clear 
objectives, the Iraq War, as imagined by these photographs, was not only a war with a 
visible (penetrable) objective, it was a war that’s objective was completed. 
 Later, in 2006, a soldier leaked photographs to Rupert Murdoch’s tabloid The Sun. 
They published the most humiliating photograph on the front page (Fig. 42), as did the 
                                                      
80 W.J.T. Mitchell. Cloning Terror: The War of Images, 9/11 to the Present. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011): 94. 
Fig. 42 - Cover of the May 
2006 issue of The Sun 
featuring an anonymous 
leaked photograph 
 71 
The New York Post, which featured Saddam doing laundry in his underwear. The Sun 
claimed that the photographs needed to be seen because they thought seeing Saddam, 
“once the world’s most feared despot with the blood of innocent thousands on his 
murderous hands, now…reduced to shuffling around his prison compound in his 
underpants and washing his OWN dirty socks in a simple bowl (their emphasis).”81 
Immediately after their printing, the U.S. military vowed to aggressively investigate the 
lead of the photographs because they “appeared to breach Geneva Convention rules on 
the humane treatment of prisoners of war.”82 
Despite the obligatory objection to the content of the image published by The Sun, 
the official image of Saddam released to the press achieved the same objective – 
humanizing and therefore demythologizing the former sovereign by invasively depicting 
his physicality. This similarity testifies not to the newsworthiness of the leaked photo, 
because frankly Saddam’s dental exam was not particularly newsworthy. The similarity 
in the objectives of these images instead should reflect on the tabloid-quality of Saddam’s 
presentation in the Western media once captured. 
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 Of course, the war had taken a very ugly turn with regard to other prisoners of 
war in May of 2004 with the leak of the Abu Ghraib archive. Until that point, the 
enormously encouraging photographic narrative seemed entirely justified even though 
only the paper objectives had been achieved – the Iraqi people were still caught in a 
bloody civil war, and no weapons of mass destruction had been found. 
 In the case of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse photos, reality would provide its 
own sinister detournement of the invented hero photographs that were popular early in 
the war. This unintended detournement is the case with the notorious photograph, 
reffered to as “the photograph with the smile (Fig. 43).” This photograph is one of the 
now infamous photographs taken by the 372nd MP Brigade serving at Abu Ghraib prison, 
west of Baghdad, in the fall of 2003.  The photograph was taken by Chuck Graner of 
Sabrina Harman posing with a 
smile and a thumbs-up next to the 
body of a recently murdered 
prisoner, Manadel al-Jamadi. This 
image, in a lot of ways, speaks 
against soldiers more effectively 
than equivalent images from 
Vietnam. The protagonist in this 
photo, Harman, is reacting to the 
corpse of al-Jamadi with delight 
rather than nonchalance.  
Fig. 43 -  Charles Graner, 2004 
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 As damage control, Bush administration disavowed Harman and the others, 
suggesting that she was one of a few bad apples that did not otherwise ruin the whole 
bunch. This reaction came almost immediately after the release of the photos. During the 
60 Minutes segment, which broke the news on May 06, 2004, Dan Rather interviewed 
General Mark Kimmet. During the interview, he made it a point not only to disavow the 
acts, but those responsible: “This is reprehensible. But this is not representative of the 
150,000 soldiers that are over here [...] I’d say the same thing to the American people ... 
Don’t judge your Army based on the actions of a few...”83 
 When Lynndie England, the soldier who would bear a large amount of the legal 
punishment for Abu Ghraib, was 
photographed for her trial, instead of 
presenting her alongside her defense team like 
most photographs of defendants, she was 
shown closely cropped by their black suited 
shoulders – compositionally isolated (Fig. 44). 
This photograph appeared on the front page of 
the May 03, 2005 issue of the New York 
Times with the caption “Guilty Plea in Abu 
Ghraib Abuse.” A telling comparison is 
between the photograph of England as an 
isolated bad apple, and the photograph of Lt. Calley (the only man sentenced for 
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wrongdoing at My Lai) that appeared in the April 04, 1971 issue of the Wisconsin State 
Journal.  In the face of a “No More War” poster Calley smiles at the news of his pardon, 
because the Nixon administration refused to cast him aside.  
 During the time between Calley and England, an odd shift took place. It is in this 
shifting position that we are confronted with a fundamental aporia. While Calley was 
pardoned for doing his duty, for being a true “American boy,” and “not questioning how 
or why we should fight,”84 England was widely reproached for not questioning the 
ethicality of her orders. There is a similar aporia when considering the role of 
photography. 
 During the high-budget documentary about the Abu Ghraib prison abuse by Errol 
Morris, Standard Operating Procedure (2008), there is a clever bit of editing when two 
conflicting views of photography are presented to accompany various slides of the blood 
remains of a murdered prisoner. Army Special Agent Brent Pack, the man who analyzed 
the metadata of the images to establish a timeline for the courts, perhaps unconsciously 
echoing Roland Barthes, describes photographs as direct records of what had been: 
“Photographs are what they are…you’re seeing what happened at that time.”85 While 
SPC Megan Ambuhl, one of the military police stationed at the prison during the time of 
the abuse, did not grant the images the same kind of truth-value. She described the 
images as mere slices of frozen time, framing as much out of view as they frame in, 
incapable of the same kind of historical truth content that memory allows: “[the 
circumstance of the actual event] doesn’t appear when you see a picture…the pictures 
                                                      
84 Harry Rosenthal. “America’s Nerve Touched by My Lai Verdict.” Wisconsin State 
Journal. 04 April 1971: 4. 
85 Errol Morris (director). (2008). Standard Operating Procedure [DVD] (Los Angeles: 
Sony Pictures Classics), 1:39:44 – 1:40:05. 
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only show you a fraction of a second. You don’t see forward and you don’t see backward 










































                                                      
86 Morris, 1:21:25 – 1:22:16. 
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION: PHOTOGRAPHY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND 
EUPHEMISMS 
 
Throughout wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, allegations were rampant of 
gross collateral damage from U.S. combat strategies. R.J. Rummel estimated that 
between 800,000 and 1,200,000 civilians died in both North and South Vietnam during 
the twenty years of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The Iraq War Logs released by 
WikiLeaks showed 66,081 civilian casualties in Iraq from January 2004 to December 
2009 as a result of U.S.-led invasion.87 No such numbers definitively exist for the war in 
Afghanistan, as was famously extolled by U.S. General Tommy Franks, “You know we 
don’t do body counts.”88 Aggregate estimates based on collective reports estimate a range 
of 10,000 to as many as 60,000 from 2001 – 2011 killed by U.S. and coalition forces, 
however many consider those numbers to be inaccurate due to the absence of systematic 
documentation available from the war in Iraq.89 
The images of these unintended deaths were much more numerous, and much 
more in the public eye during and after the Vietnam War than they have been or 
(presumably) will be as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come to a close. The 
impressions left by photographs from the Vietnam War, and the blame shouldered by 
                                                      
87 The Guardian. “Wikileaks Iraq: data journalism maps every death.” The Data Blog. 
Online. Accessed 18 January 2012. 
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88 As quoted in “Success in Afghan war hard to guage.” The San Francisco Chronicle, 23 
March 2002. 
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soldiers, lingered long after the war ended. Elizabeth Samet wrote in August of 2011, 
“The specter of this guilt – this perdurable archetype of the hostile homecoming – 
animates today’s encounters, which seem to have swung to the other unthinking 
extreme.”90 
 To a large extent, the soldiers who went to Vietnam had, until they arrived and 
saw it for what it was, romanticized war. Like the ones featured in John Wayne movies, 
and now happily replicated in Sunset Soldiers photographs. What they realized was that 
the lovely and heroic fiction that they expected was just a farce. That war was dirt and 
pain, death and destruction. The documents of the war genuinely painted this picture – 
one of disillusionment before the war ended. We experienced the same war, the dirty ugly 
one, empathetically via the metonymical photograph. If there was any lesson to be 
learned photographically from Vietnam it was this – that meddling in someone else’s 
ideological tug-of-war was messy, un-heroic business, and that when war is shown via 
photographs as a youth-wrecking, travesty-riddled, cesspool of hate perpetuation, it is a 
powerful, relatable indictment of that war. 
 That lesson is what is so disturbing about the pictures of glory when they reappear 
to give context to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reality is sanitized into euphemism. 
Photographs from the Vietnam War initiated us into a period where we could no longer 
deny the power of images in the political sphere.  When we see deep and nuanced 
portraits of soldier life, though they seem to be intended as ends in themselves, their 
ideological function cannot be taken for granted. After the Vietnam War, it’s hard to not 
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be cynical about those images that I’ve called “patriotic fables.” In glorifying and 
sentimentalizing the soldier, those photographs glorify and sentimentalize war in itself, 
which is most often neither glorious nor worthy of sentiment.  
With photojournalism, the problem of objectivity is at the heart of the problem of 
ideology. Despite the fact that on some level cameras record accurately whatever is 
framed in the lens, connotation interferes. Looking at an image of the tortured body of an 
enemy elicits an emotional response from the viewer that leads to empathy. Sometimes 
this is unwarranted. Defendants who are being tried for violent crimes often appeal 
especially inflammatory photographs. They claim that photographs are inadmissible 
evidence based on the fact that they are inflammatory and invoke a prejudiced response 
that is unfair to the person accused of the crimes.91   
If photographs of soldiers abusing the enemy are in fact mischaracterizations, then 
empathy is illegitimately manufactured.  Therefore, if we can be convinced that these 
images are generally untrue in their premises, and consider that all the images being 
huddled into secrecy are being hidden because they perpetuate a fundamental 
misconception, that although the referent appears to be abuse, in reality justice was being 
                                                      
91 For example:  “In the matter of Queen v. Jeffrey (1966) in the Supreme Court of 
Victoria (Court of Criminal Appeal) Barry, Smith and Gillard JJ., in their judgment on 
one of the grounds for appeal in that: the learned trail judge erred in admitting in 
evidence photographs that the defense requested to be excluded on the grounds that they 
were of little or no probative value, yet were so horrifying or gruesome in nature as to be 
highly prejudicial to a fair trial of the accused.  In the judgment by Smith J., it was argued 
by the appellant’s council that the trial judge ought, in the exercise of his discretion, to 
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inflicted on the deceased…It was said that their inflammatory and prejudicial effect was 
very great and far outweighed any legitimate probative effect that the could have…”  
John Horswell.  The Practice of Crime Scene Investigation. (New York: Taylor & Francis, 
2004): 136. 
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honestly done, then we can easily assume this kind of empathy prevention is not only 
warranted, but, on some level, ethical.  
 Ultimately, what this all drives down to are questions about responsibility and 
rights. Do news organizations and the government have a responsibility to show the 
public the ugly side of war or to shield them from it? Does the public have a right to see 
those ugly photographs? If the public can claim a right to access photographed content, 
then what about the rights of photographed persons? If the photographed person is held 
responsible for the content of the image, can that person claim any rights to the image? 
Any answer to any of these questions inevitably affects the answer to the other questions.  
 Photographs that imagined the Vietnam War both encouraged and reflected public 
opposition to war, making real and visible the crimes that take place under the aegis of a 
responsibility to police the world. However, the burden of those crimes fell onto the 
soldiers. It was the soldiers who functioned in the photographs as a metonym for the ugly 
war, where some would claim the unjust State was more legitimately at fault. 
Photographers during the Vietnam War felt a responsibility to document the horrors, and 
media organizations felt a responsibility to show those images to the public. In doing so 
however, the photographers violated the rights of the photographed persons and their 
post-war reputations. 
 Photographs from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan picture soldiers as worthy of a 
respect they were long denied. Photographers who were ejected from their embeds were 
ejected for violating the rights of photographed persons, but in being ejected they were 
prevented from bringing the public a view of the ugly side of war. In addition, the 
redemption of the character of the soldier doesn’t reassign the blame for the atrocities 
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committed. It further masks the trail leading to those responsible. In that masking, though 
it redeems the soldier from shame, it allows for the continuation of conflicts that cost too 
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